Morocco’s Migration Experience: A Transitional Perspective

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Abstract

Using a ‘transitional’ perspective on migration, which combines three theoretical approaches on dynamic development-migration linkages, this paper interprets the evolution of migration within, from, and to Morocco over the twentieth century. Colonization and the incorporation of rural areas, along with a certain level of socio-economic development, have spurred internal and international wage labour migration both within Morocco and from Morocco to Europe. Migration seems to be the result of development rather than the lack of development. Populations from highly marginalized regions were less likely to participate in migration than populations from the three, moderately enclosed “migration belts” which had established traditions of pre-modern, largely circular migration. At the onset of large-scale emigration in the 1960s, the spatial patterns of labour migration were significantly influenced by colonial bonds with Spain and France, selective labour recruitment, and Moroccan selective passport issuance policies.

However, the influence of such policies rapidly decreased due to the effects of migration-facilitating networks. Increasingly restrictive policies coincided with a growing reliance on family migration, permanent settlement, undocumented migration, and the exploration of new migration itineraries, and had no success in reducing migration levels. Alongside patterns of decentralizing internal migration, a spatial diffusion of international out-migration has expanded beyond the historical migration belts in response to new labour opportunities in southern Europe. Persistent demand for migrant labour, along with demographic factors and increasing aspirations, suggest that migration over formally closed borders is likely to remain high in the near future. However, in the longer term, out-migration might decrease and Morocco could increasingly develop into a migration destination for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, a transition process which may already have been set in motion.

LE VÉCU DE LA MIGRATION AU MAROC: UNE PERSPECTIVE DE TRANSITION

L’auteur interprète l’évolution de la migration au vingtième siècle à l’intérieur du Maroc, mais aussi depuis le Maroc et a destination de ce pays, en y voyant un phénomène de « transition ». Il a recours à trois notions théoriques sur les
liens dynamiques entre développement et migration pour défendre l'idée que la colonisation, l'intégration des zones rurales et l'obtention d'un certain niveau de développement économique auraient favorisé la migration de la main-d'oeuvre salariée au niveau interne, au Maroc même, et à l'échelle internationale, entre le Maroc et l’Europe. L’étude conclut que loin d’être causée par l’absence de développement, la migration serait le produit du développement.

Cette étude fait en outre le point des structures migratoires à l’intérieur et à partir du Maroc. Il semblerait que les déplacements dans l’espace de la main-d’oeuvre salariée au début de la période à l’étude aient été fortement influencés par les liens coloniaux avec l’Espagne et la France, et par les politiques sélectives pratiquées par ces pays. Ces politiques ont en revanche vite perdu de leur influence sous l’effet des réseaux facilitant la migration. En effet, malgré les politiques d’immigration de plus en plus restrictives de l’Europe, d’autres facteurs ont continué de faciliter la migration. En parallèle à une tendance à la décentralisation de la migration interne, l’éclatement dans l’espace de la migration internationale s’est étendu au-delà des zones de migration historiques sous l’effet des nouvelles opportunités apparaues sur le marché du travail en Europe du sud. Une demande systématique de main-d’oeuvre immigrée, parallèlement à des facteurs démographiques et aux nouvelles aspirations de la population, laissent à penser que l’émigration des Marocains risque fort de rester conséquente dans un avenir proche, malgré la fermeture officielle des frontières. Cela étant, à plus long terme, l’émigration pourrait se contracter et le Maroc pourrait lui-même devenir une destination pour les migrants originaires d’Afrique sub-saharienne.

LA EXPERIENCIA MIGRATORIA DE MARRUECOS: UNA PERSPECTIVA TRANSITORIA

En este documento se interpreta la evolución de la migración dentro, desde y hacia Marruecos durante el siglo XX, utilizando una perspectiva “transitoria” de la migración que combina tres enfoques teóricos de los enlaces dinámicos desarrollo-migración. La colonización, la incorporación de las áreas rurales y el logro de un cierto nivel de desarrollo económico han estimulado la migración de mano de obra retribuida internamente, dentro de Marruecos, y a escala internacional, desde Marruecos hacia Europa. En este estudio se concluye que la migración parece ser el resultado del desarrollo más que de la falta de éste.

En el presente documento se evalúan asimismo las estructuras migratorias dentro y desde Marruecos, y se extrae la conclusión de que las estructuras espaciales de las primeras migraciones de mano de obra estuvieron significativamente influídas por los vínculos coloniales con España y Francia y por las políticas selectivas de ambos países. No obstante, dichas políticas no tardaron en perder influencia ante los efectos de las redes facilitadoras de la migración. A pesar de las políticas migratorias europeas cada vez más restrictivas, existen factores que han favorecido la migración continuada. En paralelo a patrones de la migración interna descentralizada, una difusión espacial de la migración internacional hacia el exterior ha expandido más allá de los cinturones migratorios tradicionales en respuesta a nuevas oportunidades labores en el sur de Europa. La demanda
persistent de mano de obra migrante, junto con factores demográficos y aspiraciones crecientes, sugieren que es probable que la migración internacional de marroquíes a través de fronteras cerradas oficialmente siga siendo elevada en el futuro cercano. No obstante, a más largo plazo, es posible que la migración hacia el exterior del país disminuya y que Marruecos vaya convirtiéndose, cada vez más, en un destino migratorio para migrantes del África subsahariana.

INTRODUCTION

Over the second half of the twentieth century, Morocco evolved into one of the world’s leading emigration countries. Moroccans form one of Western Europe’s largest and most dispersed migrant communities, consisting of well over two million people of Moroccan descent. However, this characterization conceals a high level of internal differentiation and dynamism within the migrating population of Morocco, in which emigration, return migration, internal migration and, recently, immigration, occur simultaneously, and in which the spatial focus of these migration movements shows clear shifts over time.

Dichotomous and static push-pull models typically cannot explain the increasingly complex migration reality in Morocco, in which migrants often move in opposite directions. It seems to be more instrumental to analyse Moroccan migration within a dynamic theoretical perspective, which is able to link the occurrence of specific types of migration to broader demographic and development processes, of which migration is a constituent part. In order to better comprehend Moroccan migration, it is useful to draw on the spatio-temporal theoretical perspectives developed by Zelinsky (1971) and Skeldon (1997).

In his comprehensive effort to make a global regionalization theory for migratory movements, Skeldon (1997:52) argued that:

There is a relationship between the level of economic development, state formation and the patterns of population mobility. Very generally, we can say that where these are high, an integrated migration system exists consisting of global and local movements, whereas where they are low the migration systems are not integrated and mainly local.

Skeldon (1997: 52-53) distinguished the following five “development tiers”: the (1) old and (2) new core countries (e.g. Western Europe, North America, Japan) characterized by immigration and internal decentralization; (3) the expanding core (e.g. eastern China, southern Africa, Eastern Europe), where we find both immigration and out-migration and internal centralization (i.e. urbanization and rural-to-urban migration); (4) the labour frontier (e.g. Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines and, until recently, Spain and Portugal), which are dominated by out-migration and internal centralization; and the so-called (5) resource niche (e.g. many sub-Saharan African countries, parts of central Asia and Latin America), with variable, often weaker forms of migration.

Skeldon’s regionalization is related to Zelinsky’s (1971) hypothesis of the mobility transition, in which he linked the so-called “vital transition” to population mobility. Zelinsky’s hypothesis was a fusion between the demographic transition
theory, the notion of the spatial diffusion of innovations, the economic principle of least effort optimization, and the migration theory proposed by Lee (1966).

By employing the term vital transition, Zelinsky broadened the concept of demographic transition – commonly seen as the main cause of migration pressures – by linking it to processes of modernization, economic growth, and increasing mobility. He distinguished five social phases: (a) the pre-modern traditional society (high fertility and mortality, little natural increase if any); (b) the early transitional society (rapid decline in mortality, major population growth); (c) the late transitional society (major decline in fertility, significant but decelerating natural increase); (d) the advanced society (fertility and mortality stabilized at low levels, slight population increase if any); and (e) a future “superadvanced” society (continuing low fertility and mortality). The core of his argument was that each of these phases was linked to distinct forms of mobility, in a process that Zelinsky coined as the mobility transition.

Pre-modern societies (phase (a)) are characterized mainly by limited circular migration. In the early stages of the vital transition (phase (b), in particular), all forms of mobility increase (circular, rural colonization frontiers, internal ruralurban, international). In phase (c), international migration decreases rapidly, rural-to-urban internal migration slackens, but remains at high levels and circular movements further increase and grow in structural complexity. At the end of phase (c), the rural exodus significantly decreases, as the number of those employed in agricultural production approaches the minimum level associated with optimum economic return. In phase (d), residential mobility, urban-to-urban and circular migration become more important and countries transform themselves from net emigration to net immigration countries because of mounting immigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from developing countries. In phase (e), most internal migration is urban-urban and residential, while immigration of labourers continues.

Zelinsky’s approach was innovative, because it conceived of various functionally related forms of migration within a broader spatio-temporal development perspective, which does not naively assume a negative linear relation between development and migration. It is also a diffusionist model, which assumes that the inclusion into (international) migration systems tends to spread progressively from relatively developed zones to less developed zones.

Zelinsky’s hypothesis is profoundly rooted in modernization theory, which has also been the subject of later criticism. The model is ahistorical in suggesting that there is a single, unilinear path towards development whereas, in reality, migration and development do not affect areas in the same way (Findlay et al., 1998). There is evidence that the sequence of mobility change proposed by Zelinsky, on the basis of the European experience, does not exactly apply to contemporary developing countries (Skeldon, 1992). Also the demographic transition, and associated mortality and fertility declines, have shown considerable diversity in different historical and geographical settings (Hirschman, 1994). Furthermore, contemporary developing countries tend experience faster demographic transitions than was the case in northern Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Kirk, 1996: 368). Mobility transition theory has also been rightly criticized for its false assumption of largely immobile traditional societies and its failure to
specify the actual causal relation between mobility change and demographic transitions (Skeldon, 1997:32-34).

Yet the validity of this criticism does not necessarily upset the underlying idea of Zelinsky’s hypothesis: although the historical conditions under which migration within and from the developing world occurs are different from those of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there is little that is unique about these processes (cf. Skeldon, 1997: 40). There is a fundamental, but not linear relationship between the occurrence of specific forms of migration and broader transformation processes.

In fact, there is ample empirical evidence that, in general, socio-economic development, in combination with demographic transition-related high population growth, tends initially to lead to increased diffusion of migration (initially internal, later international) across communities (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998). The countries with the lowest GNP and the highest population growth do generally not exhibit the highest rates of out-migration to the Western world (cf. Böhning, 1994; Olesen, 2002). The world’s main emigration countries typically are upper-middle to lower-middle income countries.

Furthermore, although it has gone surprisingly unnoticed, migration economists have unintentionally provided additional economic evidence for, and further refinement of, the transitional migration perspective by uncovering the anatomy of the “migration hump”. Martin (1993), and Martin and Taylor (1996), argued that a temporary increase in migration – a migration hump – has been a usual part of the process of economic development. In the early stages of a country’s economic development, an increase in wealth tends to lead to a rise in internal migration and emigration, since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating. Only at later stages of development do regions and countries tend to transform from net labour exporters to net labour importers (cf. Martin and Taylor, 1996; Böhning, 1994: 196; Olesen, 2002: 141). This has happened in recent decades with countries as diverse as Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea.

A country’s positive economic development and its decreasing income differentials with destination countries therefore tend to have an inverted J-curve or inverted U-curve effect on emigration. Emigration steeply increases in the initial phases of economic development and only later gradually decreases (Martin and Taylor, 1996). This migration hump seems to reflect past (Massey, 1991) and contemporary (Olesen, 2002:141) migration patterns rather adequately and shows a high degree of correspondence with Zelinsky’s and Skeldon’s models.

This appears to be another basis for rejecting relativist claims that no general inferences whatsoever can be made about the historical, spatio-temporal evolution of migration in relation to broader development processes. In fact, Zelinsky’s, Skeldon’s, and Martin and Taylor’s approaches can be integrated into one single, spatio-temporal “transitional” migration perspective, which recognizes the complex, non-linear interlinkages between the occurrence of various forms of migration and general social, economic, and demographic transformation processes.
Thus, it is possible to incorporate the criticism of Zelinksy’s theoretical perspective by modifying the theory, rather than rejecting it, provided that some conditions are met. First, the modified model should allow for historical-regional, timespatial variations viewed as a variety of patterns within a general system. Second, a realistic “transitional” perspective on migration should perceive the relation between development stages and the occurrence of specific types of migration as indirect and probabilistic rather than direct and deterministic. Moreover, this relation is not unidirectional, because a decreasing relative development level may also transform an immigration country into an emigration country. A third modification to this transitional migration perspective would broaden the view of “development” beyond a narrow focus on economic and demographic variables. The migration-development nexus also comprises important social and cultural dimensions. Besides rising incomes and improved transportation and communication infrastructure, factors like education and access to information and social capital similarly initially tend to increase people’s aspirations and abilities to migrate (cf. de Haas, 2005, 2006). It is therefore necessary to conceive of “development” as the more general increase of people’s capabilities.

Within an integrated transitional migration perspective, “development” in its broader sense is initially likely to increase people’s propensity to migrate, predominantly internally at first, and increasingly internationally in later stages of development. In the long run, decreasing spatial (internal and international) opportunity gaps might decrease people’s incentives to migrate, likely causing a slowdown in both rural-to-urban and international out-migration, and increasing the diversification of migration patterns, while increasing the importance of immigration.

The remainder of this paper describes and explains the geographically differentiated evolution of migration patterns within, from, and to Morocco over the twentieth century, as an integral part of broader, structural transformations in the macro-context at the national and international level. The aim is to evaluate the extent to which the case of Moroccan migration can be comprehended from a transitional migration perspective. This analysis will be used to derive tentative predictions of future migration patterns.

PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL POPULATION MOBILITY (UNTIL 1962)

Morocco’s pre-colonial population history has been characterized by continually shifting patterns of human settlement. Centuries-old seasonal and circular migration patterns existed between certain rural areas – such as between the Rif Mountains and the southern oases – and the relatively humid regions and the imperial towns of western and northern Morocco (cf. Büchner, 1986; De Mas, 1991). The trans-Saharan caravan trade engendered significant forced and voluntary population mobility between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. The French colonization of Algeria in 1830 heralded the beginning of a period of economic and political restructuring, which created entirely new migration patterns within the Maghreb region. The increasing demand for wage labour on the farms
of French colons, and in northern cities such as Algiers and Oran, attracted a rising number of Moroccan seasonal and circular migrants over the second half of the nineteenth century (cf. Büchner, 1986; Fadloullah et al., 2000: 51).

In 1912, the French-Spanish protectorate over Morocco was formally established. While France gained control over the heartland of Morocco, the Spanish protectorate was mainly limited to the “Western Sahara” and the northern Rif mountain zone. This French-Spanish partition would fundamentally affect future migration patterns. The integration of the largely autonomous tribes of Morocco’s hinterland into the modern state and the capitalist economy – often as workers on road construction and other infrastructure works – and the rapid growth of cities along the Atlantic coast shaped new markets for mounting rural-to-urban migration.

During World War I, a crucial lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of Moroccan men for the French army, industry, and mines. Moroccans were predominantly recruited from Agadir and Tiznit in the southwestern Sous region (Bonnet and Bossard, 1973). Between 1914 and 1918, more than 35,000 Moroccans left for France, and between 34,000 and 40,000 joined the French army (Muus, 1995: 198). Workers were recruited especially from areas that had shown strong resistance to the French, as it was expected that this would curb internal political unrest. Although most migrants returned after the end of war, international migration resumed after 1920, because of the flourishing French economy (Obdeijn, 1993).

In World War II, labour shortages again led to the recruitment of Moroccan men in the French occupied zone. An additional 126,000 Moroccan men served in the French army during World War II, and in the subsequent wars in Korea and French Indochina, most of whom returned to Morocco after the end of each war (Bidwell, 1973). Critically, when France stopped recruiting Algerian workers during the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962), the migration of factory and mine workers from Morocco increased (Obdeijn, 1993). Between 1949 and 1962, the Moroccan population in France increased from approximately 20,000 to 53,000. After Morocco became independent from France in 1956, political and military tensions between Morocco and Algeria increased, leading to the closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1962. This meant that circular migration to Algeria came to a definitive halt (Heinemeijer et al., 1977).

Migration to “French” Algeria often turned out to be the first step in subsequent migration to France. Some early Moroccan “guest workers” in France followed their former colon employers, who left Algeria en masse after independence. Nevertheless, this post-colonial migration was modest compared with the decade following 1962, which dramatically changed the face of Moroccan migration.

**THE GREAT MIGRATION BOOM (1963-1972)**

Beginning in the 1950s, rapid post-war economic growth in northwest Europe created expanding unskilled labour shortages in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction, and agriculture. This triggered increased emigration of
“guest workers” from poorer countries around the Mediterranean. Until the early 1960s, most workers were recruited from southern European countries. When this migration stagnated, attention shifted towards south Mediterranean countries. Morocco signed agreements on the recruitment of workers with former West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964), and the Netherlands (1969). This initiated the spatial diversification of Moroccan migration to Europe, which had formerly been directed mainly towards France. Migration boomed, particularly from 1967 to its peak in 1972.

The system of formal recruitment by specialized agencies was important only in the initial years of labour migration. By the 1960s and 1970s spontaneous settlement and informal recruitment by companies had become far more numerically important (Collyer, 2004; Reniers, 1999: 684). Administrative obstacles, long waiting lists, and the accompanying bribery incited people to migrate as “tourists”. Migrants were often assisted by already-settled migrant relatives or friends, who often acted as intermediaries between employers and potential migrants (Reniers, 1999: 683). Many migrants succeeded in obtaining permanent residence papers through a series of legalization campaigns in the Netherlands (1975), Belgium (1975), and in France (1981-1982) (Muus 1995: 199). In 1965, about 30,000 Moroccans were living in Europe. By 1972, this number had increased tenfold to an estimated 300,000 (Bonnet and Bossard, 1973), increasing to over 400,000 only three years later.

**FAMILY REUNIFICATION (1973-1989)**

In many respects, colonial and post-colonial migration patterns were a modified continuation and spatial extension of ancient patterns of circular migration (cf. Ben Ali, 1996: 346; De Mas, 1991). Not only did most host societies expect this migration to be temporary, most migrants themselves, in accordance with an ancient tradition of circular migration, intended to return after they had saved enough money to buy some land, construct a house, or start their own enterprise.

The 1973 oil crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in rising unemployment and a structurally lower demand for unskilled labourers in Europe. Consequently, northwest European countries closed their frontiers to new labour migrants. However, Morocco suffered even more than the European countries from the high oil prices and the global economic downturn, and many Moroccan migrants did not return, but ended up staying permanently in Europe. The economic situation in Morocco deteriorated, and, following two failed coups d’état against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972, the country also entered into a period of increasing political instability and repression.

The closing of European borders, eliminating the option of migrating again if return home proved unsuccessful, combined with the grim political and economic prospects in Morocco, explain why many migrants decided that it was safer to stay in Europe. Paradoxically, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies thereby stimulated the permanent settlement of migrants rather than reducing it (Fargues, 2004; Obdeijn, 1993), and interrupted the traditional, circular character
of Moroccan migration. Subsequently, it was mainly through large-scale family reunification – which heralded this shift from circular to more permanent migration – that the registered population of Moroccans in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany increased from 400,000 in 1975 to almost 1 million in 1992 (Muus, 1995: 202).

Return migration among Moroccans has been low compared to other immigrant groups in Europe (Fadloullah et al., 2000: 56). The high rate of naturalization, especially among second generation Moroccans, also testifies to the permanent character of Moroccan migration (Berrada, 1990; Fadloullah et al., 2000: 56). From 1992 to 2001 at least 430,000 Moroccans acquired the nationality of an EU member state, more than any other immigrant group in Europe (OECD, 2004).

**DIVERSIFYING MIGRATION PATTERNS (1990-2005)**

While family reunification was largely complete by the end of the 1980s, family formation gained significance as a major source of new migration from Morocco during the 1990s. For many Moroccans, marrying a partner in Europe has become the only option to enter the classic destination countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany) legally. In addition, large numbers of second generation Moroccan descendants living in Europe prefer to marry a partner from the region of origin (cf. Lievens, 1999). Such international marriages continued to fuel migration to Europe.

A second consequence of the more restrictive immigration policies was an increase in undocumented migration to northwest Europe. Especially during the period of high economic growth in the 1990s, undocumented migrants were attracted by the growing demand for cheap labour in agriculture, construction, and the service sector (cf. Collyer, 2004). Undocumented migrants often obtained residence permits through legalization or by marrying a Moroccan or European partner in the destination country, that is, through “becoming” legal family migrants after having spent years in an irregular situation.

The third major development has been the diversification of migration destinations. Former “labour frontier” countries Spain and Italy have emerged as new destination countries since the mid-1980s. Until Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in 1990 and 1991, respectively, Moroccans could enter easily as tourists, after which many of them overstayed and became de facto undocumented migrants. As in northwest Europe, the establishment of visa requirements led to the increasing prevalence of undocumented migration.

Until recently, the majority of Moroccan women tended to migrate within the scope of family migration, that is, they migrated to reunite or form a family. Since 1990, however, an increasing proportion of independent Moroccan labour migrants, in particular to Spain and Italy, are women. The majority work as domestic workers, nannies, cleaners, or in agriculture or small industries (Costanzo, 1999; Fadloullah et al., 2000; Salih, 2001).

On several occasions over the past two decades, the Italian and Spanish
governments have granted legal status to hundreds of thousands of undocumented Moroccan migrants through successive legalization campaigns (cf. López Garcia, 1999). Between 1980 and 2004, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in Spain and Italy increased from about 20,000 to 550,000. Italy, and particularly Spain, have taken over from France as the primary destination for new Moroccan labour migrants.

Since the 1973 oil crisis, smaller numbers of Moroccans have migrated to Libya and the oil-rich Gulf Countries, generally to work on a temporary contract basis. Since the 1990s, the United States and the French-speaking Canadian province of Québec have also attracted small, but rapidly increasing, numbers of migrants, though these are generally well-educated, in contrast to the predominantly low-skilled migrants entering Europe. Moroccan Jews followed a distinct pattern of out-migration, emigrating en masse to France, Canada, and Israel, after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967. As a result, Morocco’s Jewish population dwindled from over 250,000 around 1948 to approximately 5,000 persons today (cf. Kenbib, 1999).

**FIGURE 1. EXPANSION OF POPULATION OF MOROCCAN DESCENT IN EUROPE, SPECIFIED FOR FRANCE (1955-2005)**

![Figure 1](image-url)

Source: National statistical services; De Haas, 2003; Moroccan consular data, in Fargues, 2005

Figure 1 illustrates the remarkably constant increase of the Moroccan migrant population despite the increasingly restrictive immigration policies. It also shows the decreasing spatial focus on France. The combined effects of (1) family reunification; (2) family formation; (3) natural increase; (4) undocumented migration; and (5) new labour migration to Spain and Italy explain why the number of people of Moroccan descent living in Europe has increased more than sevenfold from 300,000 in 1972, on the eve of the recruitment freeze, to at least 2.1 million around the turn of the century. The rapid increase since the late
1990s primarily reflects the large-scale legalizations in Spain, and to a lesser extent, Italy.

Table 1 shows the number of Moroccans living abroad according to data from receiving country statistics and Moroccan consulates. The Moroccan figures tend to be much higher because they include migrants and their descendants who have acquired European citizenship and may also include some undocumented migrants. Additionally, in several European countries, such as France and Belgium, Moroccans descendants possessing double citizenship are not counted as “Moroccans”. According to Moroccan consular data, almost 3.1 million Moroccans lived abroad in 2004, among which 2.6 million lived in Europe. This does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent currently living in Israel. In total, more than 8.5 percent of Morocco’s population of 30
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: TRANS-SAHARAN MIGRATION

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has developed into a transit migration country for a mixed group of asylum seekers and, increasingly, labour migrants from sub-Saharan Africa heading to Spain and further into Europe. These, predominantly undocumented, migrants generally enter Morocco at the border from Algeria after they have crossed the Sahara overland, mainly from Niger. Initially, this primarily was a reaction to political turmoil and civil war affecting countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. Since 2000, there has been a sharp increase in the number of migrants, primarily labour migrants, coming from an increasingly diverse array of other countries. These include: Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Cameroon, and, recently, even Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (cf. Barros et al., 2002; Lahlou, 2005)

It is believed that each year tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans migrate to Europe through Spain. Although most migrants consider Morocco a country of transit through which to enter Europe illegally via southern Spain or the Canary Islands, an increasing number of migrants who fail to enter Europe apparently prefer to settle in Morocco as a “second best” option, rather than returning to their dangerous, politically unstable, and substantially poorer home countries (cf. Alioua, 2005; Barros et al., 2002). Thousands, or even tens of thousands, are believed to have settled down in cities like Tangiers, Casablanca, and Rabat on a temporary or semi-permanent basis, where they sometimes find jobs in the petty trade, construction, and the informal service sector. Others try to pursue studies in Morocco. These migrants face substantial xenophobia and generally lack any residency or refugee status. Frequent round-ups have occurred in immigrant neighbourhoods and in improvised camps close to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melililia and larger cities. Unauthorized migrants are regularly deported to the Algerian border (Barros et al., 2002; Lindstrom, 2002; Schuster, 2005).

In many respects, the Strait of Gibraltar has become Europe’s Rio Grande. Spain is located a mere 14 kilometres from the Moroccan coast, and Morocco’s Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilia on the northern coast literally represent “Europe in Africa”. Spain is thus the main entrance to the Schengen area for African immigrants (Huntoon, 1998). Undocumented migrants usually enter Spain either in *pateras* (small fishing boats chartered by smugglers), speedboats, hidden in vans and trucks, or carrying false papers. Since the mid 1990s, intensified border patrols in the Strait of Gibraltar have incited migrants to cross from more eastern places on the Mediterranean coast and to explore new crossing points to Europe, such as travelling from the Western Sahara, Mauritania, or Senegal to the Canary Islands, or via Tunisia and Libya to Sicily, Lampedusa, mainland Italy, and Malta.
REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION IN MIGRATION PARTICIPATION

There are distinct patterns of spatial clustering and specialization in migration, resulting in a concentration of migrants from particular sending regions within Morocco in specific countries, regions, and even cities within Europe (cf. Ben Ali, 1996: 348). On the basis of migration rates at the provincial level (Refass, 1990: 228), it is possible to distinguish three principal Moroccan migration belts: the eastern part of the Rif mountain area, the southwestern Sous region, and the (usually river) oases located southeast of the High Atlas (see Map 1).

Figure 2: Main zones of international out-migration in Morocco

Internal and international migration from the first migration belt, the Rif area, exhibited a pattern distinct from that of “French” Morocco because most of the Rif area fell under the Spanish protectorate. Internal migration to large cities in “French” Morocco was limited. The lack of colonial connections, and the fact that Riffians generally do not speak French, partly explain why migrants from the Rif have concentrated less in France, and relatively more in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Scandinavia and, since the 1980s, Spain (cf. De Mas, 1990; López García, 1999).
Since early colonial times, migrants from the Sous region migration belt have migrated as labour migrants and soldiers to France. International migration from the Sous has subsequently remained overwhelmingly oriented towards its former colonizer. The Soussi also developed a strong tradition of internal migration, in which Soussi workers and traders spread over the entire country. Twentieth century migration from the third migration belt, the river oases located in the valleys south and east of the Atlas mountains, has targeted both the cities of Atlantic Morocco and foreign destinations. Migration to Europe has been predominantly oriented towards France, although there are distinct pockets of migration to the Netherlands and Belgium.

It has often been argued that international migration has predominantly occurred from these regions, because the most intensive out-migration typically occurs in rural regions characterized by low rainfall (Bencherifa, 1996: 404) and high population densities in relation to limited agricultural resources (Collyer, 2004: 29; Fadloullah et al., 2000: 53). However, a more detailed look reveals that the areas with the heaviest out-migration are not generally the most marginalized in Morocco. Close scrutiny of intra-regional differences in migration participation in the Rif and Sous areas mapped by Bonnet and Bossard (1973), reveals that coastal areas tend to participate remarkably more in international migration than more isolated, inland areas.

People from areas located at the “margin of the margin” tend to migrate less and most migration from such areas tends to be internal. Similarly, in southern Morocco, sedentary peasant populations of relatively well-connected oases, endowed with better infrastructural links and socio-political relations to the outside world, participated earlier and more intensively in international migration than sedentary or nomadic (and semi-nomadic) people living in small oases or other isolated areas in the Atlas mountains, steppes, and deserts. Typically the poorest people within sending communities are not the ones most likely to migrate, because they lack the resources to do so (de Haas, 2003).

Furthermore, it does not seem to be coincidental that the earliest departure zones of international migrants have also been the regions with established traditions of seasonal and circular migration within Morocco and towards Algeria (cf. Büchner, 1986; De Mas, 1991). This history has facilitated their participation in new forms of rural-to-urban and international migration.

Political and ethnic factors have also played a major role in shaping international migration patterns. Both the colonial and the Moroccan state actively stimulated migration from previously autonomous, generally Berber-speaking, tribal regions which had a rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the urban state authorities. The French opposed recruiting in the more central, Arabophone areas because they intended to deploy those workers on the farms of the French colons in the Atlantic plains (De Mas 1978). In the post-independence years, economic crises, political discontent, and perceived discrimination resulted in several insurrections in such regions.

The Moroccan state quickly recognized the possibilities for relieving economic
and political tensions presented by a migration policy that promoted emigration from these regions, in particular from the notoriously turbulent Rif (De Mas 1978; Obdeijn, 1993; Reniers, 1999). These policies were mainly pursued by directing recruiters (especially the non-French speaking areas, the Netherlands, Flanders, and Germany) to these areas and through selective passport issuance policies. In fact, this merely continued earlier French policies to recruit workers and soldiers in rural, Berber regions (cf. De Mas, 1978).

Since the 1980s, a spatial diffusion process has occurred, in which the international migration experience spread to regions that used to predominantly feature internal migration (Bencherifa, 1996). For instance, the region around Khenifra (in the Middle Atlas) recently sent large numbers of migrants to Italy and Spain. The region of Laârache (south of Tangiers) recently witnessed increased migration to Spain and the United Kingdom, and the Tadla plain (south of Khouribga) has been characterized by migration to Italy (Costanzo, 1999: 43; Fadloullah et al., 2000: 51-52, 99-100; Refass, 1999: 100).

THE DECENTRALIZATION OF INTERNAL MIGRATION AND “REVERSE” MIGRATION

Notwithstanding the high levels of international migration, internal migration remains more important in numerical terms. Some earlier studies throw light on the magnitude of rural-to-urban migration and point to the crucial function of internal migration as a precursor to international migration (cf. Noin, 1970; Laghaout, 1989). This is exemplified by the recent transformations of several regions from internal to international migration regions of departure.

FIGURE 3: RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION GROWTH MOROCCO (1900-2000)

Source: Direction de la Statistique Maroc, Noin, 1970

In the post-independence period, following what appears to be a universal trend of mobility, Morocco’s urban population has increased much faster than the rural population, which stagnated throughout the 1990s, even though birth rates
remained higher in rural regions (see Figure 2). According to the 2004 national census, 55 per cent of the Moroccan population lived in an urban environment. This only partly reflects the character of migration from rural areas to the big cities. What is happening in Morocco, in fact, is more complex than the often evoked image of a massive “rural exodus”. Most officially “rural” regions have in fact witnessed a net population increase, mainly because of the development of centrally located villages into small or medium-sized urban centres within the “rural” provinces themselves. This process of micro- and meso-urbanization has decentralized patterns of internal migration, with decreasing numbers of internal migrants settling in the big cities (cf. Berriane, 1996; Kagermeier, 1989: 118-9).

Interestingly, there is substantial evidence that urban-oriented consumption and remittance-propelled investments by international migrants in housing and private enterprises have spurred the growth of smaller towns in sending areas. The employment and entrepreneurial opportunities in such migrant boomtowns have subsequently created a reverse movement of internal migrants from within and outside these regions (Berriane, 1996; Bonnet and Bossard, 1973; de Haas, 2003).

**MOROCCAN MIGRATION POLICIES**

Throughout the post-independence period, the Moroccan state has actively stimulated emigration. As mentioned above, besides acting as a presumed “safety valve” to prevent political tensions in Berber areas, migration and the associated counter-flow of remittances were also viewed as a tool for national economic development. From the outset, the Moroccan state has attempted to maintain tight control on migrant communities in Europe by explicitly addressing migrants as Moroccan subjects and actively discouraging their integration into the receiving countries (Obdeijn, 1993). However, an ominous stagnation in remittances in the 1990s and a growing consciousness that these policies alienated migrants rather than binding them closer to the Moroccan state prompted the Moroccan authorities to adopt a more positive attitude towards emigrants. A ministry for Moroccans residing abroad was created in 1990, and new policies were designed to encourage remittances and investments by migrants. Along with the partial dismantling of the control apparatus in Europe, the result has been a more positive government attitude towards naturalization, dual citizenship, and voting rights for migrants abroad.

Through the effectiveness of fiscal policies, the development of an efficient banking system, and the return of macro-economic stability, Morocco has relatively successfully directed remittances through official channels. Notwithstanding some fluctuations, remittances surged from 200 million dirham (US$ 23 million) in 1968 to over 18.5 billion dirham (US$ 2.1 billion) in 1992. After a stagnation over the 1990s at levels around US$ 2.3 billion, a surge from 2001 to 2004 brought remittances up to US$ 4.2 billion and an estimated US$ 5.6 billion in 2006 (World Development Indicators database). The unexpected structural solidity of remittances can be explained by the unforeseen persistence of family and labour migration to northwestern and southern Europe, and the greater than predicted durability of transnational and transgenerational links
between migrants and nonmigrants (de Haas and Plug, 2006).

Remittances have proved to be a less volatile and financially greater source of foreign exchange than official development assistance and foreign direct investment. Remittances constitute a vital element in sustaining Morocco’s balance of payments (see figure 3). Although government officials are generally disappointed about migrants’ low propensity to return and start enterprises, the cumulative effect of consumption and small-scale investments by international migrants have substantially improved living conditions, contributed to poverty reduction, and boosted economic activities in several migrant sending areas (Berriane, 1996; de Haas, 2003; Teto, 2001).

FIGURE 4: VALUE OF REMITTANCES, TOTAL EXPORTS, TOTAL IMPORTS AND MAJOR EXPORT PRODUCTS (1981-2001)

Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (annual); World Bank (Morocco at a Glance)

MOROCCO AS A LABOUR FRONTIER COUNTRY

The case of Morocco seems to conform to the transitional perspective on migration, which predicts that development in its broader sense tends to be initially associated with increasing internal and, in later stages, international outmigration. Fundamental changes in the political and economic macro-context explain how Morocco became firmly integrated in the Mediterranean-European migration system. Colonization, the incorporation of Morocco’s formerly semiautonomous tribal hinterland into the capitalist economy and the modern (first
colonial and then Moroccan) state, as well as urbanization and the concomitant development of infrastructure, allowed the evolution of new, increasingly complex and functionally related, patterns of migration, which are a partial extension but also a fundamental transformation of pre-modern forms of labour mobility.

In compliance with the transitional migration perspective, internal and, subsequently, international migration increased in the early phases of (1) social and (2) economic development, since more people (a) aspire to and (b) can afford to migrate. This also seems to apply at the regional and intra-regional levels. A key observation in this respect is that the poorest and most isolated areas – the “margin of the margin” – have not tended to produce the most migrants. In particular international migration seems to be the result of a certain level of development rather than of absolute poverty. This also exemplifies the limited explanatory power of conceiving migration in terms of artificially separated, static “push” and “pull” factors, which rule out varying aspiration levels. The gravity logic of the push-pull model would lead us to expect that most migrants originate from the most deprived areas, an expectation disproved by this example.

The analysis also provided support for our conceptualization of migration as a spatial diffusion process both at the origin and the destination. In recent decades the international migration experience has spread beyond the historical “migration belts” to less developed zones that used to be predominantly oriented towards internal migration. This paralleled the growing complexity of internal migration patterns comprising a de-concentration of migration to smaller urban centres and reverse internal migration towards emigration areas. The analysis also demonstrated that internal migration tends to function as a precursor to international migration over the course of migration transitions.

In fact, Morocco is a typical example of what Skeldon (1997) called a “labour frontier country”. Such countries are characterized by upper-lower and lowermiddle income levels, sharply falling birth rates, rather high, but decreasing, population growth, and a steep increase in the number of young adults entering the labour market. Their modest social, economic, and infrastructural development is thought to motivate and enable people to emigrate in large numbers. Moroccan population growth reached a peak in 1965 and started to decline after that, mainly due to a steep decrease in fertility rates from 6.89 in 1972 to 2.75 in 2002. However, the growth of the working age population increased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. This demographic transition neatly coincided with the explosive start of Morocco’s international migration boom, which peaked in 1972. This makes it tempting to attribute the migration boom directly to Morocco’s demographic transition. However, although high population growth and high international migration do tend to occur simultaneously, this does not mean that rapid population growth is automatically associated with more migration. After all, population growth is only one component of a complex chain of processes (cf. Coleman, 1999).

First, growth of working age population – which typically lags behind population growth – seems to be a more essential factor than fertility or gross population growth as such. In Morocco, the discrepancy between the increase of the working age population and shrinking demand for labour has been particularly significant
and increasing ever since the Oil Crisis, leading to high unemployment (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003; Giubilaro, 1997: 58). This suggests that the association between declining fertility and declining emigration propensities is likely to reflect a lag rather than being the more direct link suggested by Zelinsky and others.

Second, the fact that international migration from Morocco boomed in the 1963-1972 period, is also strongly related to a conjuncture of internal and external political and economic trends that happened to coincide with Morocco’s demographic transition. An established tradition of “colonial” migration to Algeria and France, a high demand for unskilled labour in northwest Europe, direct labour recruitment in Morocco, and pro-emigration polices pursued by the Moroccan government due to economic downturn and political instability provided a unique environment leading to large-scale migration.

The actual propensity to migrate is not directly determined by demographic and other internal factors, but this element interacts with external political and economic factors. The interplay of all these factors eventually determines to what extent expanding populations can build their desired futures within their own country. The conceptualization of migration as a transitional process should therefore always be embedded into the historical and geographical macro-context in which specific transitions occur. Consequently, the transitional migration perspective should not be conceived as a model that predicts an inevitable sequence of migration events to unfold from internal transformation processes.

After all, migration does not take place in a social, ethnic, and political void. In Morocco, the very process of colonization created the structural preconditions under which large-scale migration could occur. Especially at the onset of largescale migration, spatially differentiated colonial bonds with Spain and France, active labour recruitment in specific, often dissident, Berber regions, and selective passport issuance policies had a decisive influence in establishing the spatially clustered, specialized migration itineraries between distinct regions in Morocco and specific European countries and cities. Moreover, the orientation to French language and culture might also explain why Moroccan migrants to Canada prefer to settle in French-speaking Quebec. Likewise, the growing use of English in Morocco might play a role in explaining the increasing migration to the United States and the United Kingdom.

Yet the influence of external political, ethnic, and linguistic factors is only really decisive in the first phase of the establishment of new migration itineraries. The Moroccan example shows how quickly policy influence over migration trends decreased. Migration-facilitating networks largely counteracted restrictive immigration polices after 1973.

Moreover, the authoritarian colonial and Moroccan state of the protectorate and the first post-independence decades could maintain a higher degree of migration control than the present government, essentially by depriving Moroccans of basic civil rights – such as refusing to issue passports or forcing a return from France.

Ironically, development or “progress” in the form of the post-war extension of the European constitutional welfare state (which implicitly granted more rights to
migrants), the increasing civil liberties in Morocco itself, as well as Moroccans’ own enhanced exposure to education and media, have significantly reduced the capacity of both the Moroccan government and the receiving states to control migration and migrants.

Lastly, however, the principal root cause of the ongoing migration has remained unchanged: the huge gap in social and economic opportunities between Morocco and European countries. The significance of (1) policies and (2) networks is considerable in (a) starting and (b) perpetuating spatially clustered migration flows, but should not be overstated. After all, large-scale migration is unlikely to occur or persist at high levels in the absence of its fundamental cause. This also provides ample reason to broaden our view from “wage” to “opportunity” gaps when attempting to explain migration, so as to include non-monetary dimensions of development, including political freedoms, educational opportunities, social security, and health care. Europe is an enticing option, not only because it offers higher wages, but also better access to education, information, and individual freedoms.

**FUTURE TRENDS**

Accounting for demographic, economic, and political macro-determinants, it is likely that migration from Morocco will remain significant at least for the coming two decades. First, in Spain and Italy, recent labour migrants have been laying the foundations for new migrant communities, and these are likely to increase through further legalization and family reunification. Family formation is likely to continue to increase the ranks of Moroccan migrant communities in northwest Europe.

Second, unemployment and the general lack of opportunities in Morocco will continue to motivate increasingly well-educated and ambitious young women and men to migrate abroad, either legally or illegally. In recent years, economic growth has been too modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Moroccan labour market (cf. Giubilaro, 1997: 64-5; Fadloullah et al., 2000: xxiii). In 2000, total unemployment was 12 per cent, but the urban unemployment rate stood at 21.4 per cent, as opposed to 15.8 per cent in 1990. Youth unemployment has regularly topped 30 per cent since the early 1990s (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003). University graduates, in particular, still face huge difficulties in finding appropriate jobs (Giubilaro, 1997; White, 1999).

At first glance, current political trends do not seem to favour Moroccan migration to Europe. Immigration control is a high-ranking issue on the EU agenda, which has considerably strained its relation with Morocco. There is also increasing concern about the role of Morocco as a transit country for sub-Saharan migrants. In direct negotiations, the re-admission of undocumented migrants remains a pressing issue. Since 2004, Morocco has sustained a high level of bilateral cooperation with Spain in joint naval patrols. In recent years, and in particular after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in May 2003 – which involved several Moroccans – immigration has been increasingly linked to security issues.
On the other hand, we have seen past Moroccan emigration persist notwithstanding three decades of increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Although the Moroccan government is formally complying with the EU’s restrictive objectives – it passed a new restrictive immigration law in 2003 and implements EU-funded programmes to “combat” migration from Morocco – serious doubts remain about whether it is possible to curb migration as long as its (fundamentally developmental) root causes persist.

Remittances are one of the pillars of the Moroccan economy, and continuing migration is the best way to ensure future remittance potential. Although the explicit labour-exporting policies of the 1960s and 1970s have been abandoned, and at least lip service is being paid to the restrictionist migration aims of the European Union, the Moroccan state has, in fact, little interest in a decline in migration while European employers are in need of Moroccan labour. In the meantime, migration continues and governments on both sides of the Mediterranean are unlikely to expend genuine energy to stop this movement (de Haas and Plug, 2006).

The long-term potential for Moroccan-European labour migration crucially depends on the evolution of the broader political-economic context in both sending and receiving countries, trends which are notoriously difficult to predict. However, assuming that economic growth continues, it is likely that the demand for both unskilled and skilled migrant labour in Europe will persist, or even increase, especially in the relatively large informal sectors of southern European countries (cf. Collyer, 2004; Fargues, 2004; Huntoon, 1998). Various economic sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and services, are already heavily dependent on cheap and often undocumented migrant labour (cf. Collyer, 2004).

On the supply side, the dramatic reductions in Moroccan fertility since 1972 will start to reduce the number of people attaining working age beginning in 2010, and reach full momentum between 2015-2020 (Courbage, 1999). Consequently, the next generation entering the labour market theoretically will theoretically face less labour market competition and bear an exceptionally light demographic burden compared to past and future generations (Fargues, 2004). This may eventually lead to declining international migration, exactly as the transitional migration perspective predicts.

However, whether, to what extent, and when, this decline will really happen, crucially depends on future economic growth, job creation, and political stability in Morocco. These factors, in turn, are partly contingent on various exogenous factors, in particular on how Morocco’s association and free trade agreements with the EU affect the competitiveness of the Moroccan economy (cf. White, 1999; Fargues, 2004). The (declining) tail of the migration hump is by no means inevitable. As Martin and Taylor (1996: 57) warned, under unfavourable economic and political conditions, or if economic growth is accompanied by increasing income inequality, a migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent “migration plateau” of sustained out-migration.

Migration hump theory predicts that emigration tends to decrease steeply if
income differentials between sending and receiving countries diminish to values of between 4 or 5 to 1 (Martin and Taylor, 1996: 58). With GDP per capita gaps ranging from 12 to 20 (5.6 to 7.6 in purchasing power parity terms) in 2001, substantial time will be required for per capita GDPane in Morocco and European countries to converge, if this is to happen at all.

On the other hand, whereas absolute numbers of Moroccan out-migration have been relatively constant, this means that the migration rates show a declining trend. Furthermore, based on the experiences of countries that have previously undergone this migration transition, the transitional migration perspective predicts that the break-even point for in-out migration is preceded by a period in which large-scale, though declining, out-migration simultaneously occurs with increasing immigration from relatively poorer countries.

In Morocco, this process may have been set in motion by the mounting trans-Saharan (mainly overland) immigration from Sub-Saharan countries. The establishment of what appears to be a new trans-Saharan migration system is entirely consistent with the transitional migration perspective. This phenomenon also exemplifies the importance of relative deprivation in explaining migration: while many Moroccans wish to migrate to Europe, Morocco is a comparatively attractive country for many sub-Saharan migrants. This might herald an era of increasing African migration to, and settlement in, Morocco and the coexistence of immigration and emigration typical to “transitional” countries. Interestingly, this migration transition might well restore Morocco’s historical function as a bridge between sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Europe.

NOTES

1. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Paolo De Mas and Herman Obdeijn for their valuable comments on an earlier drafts of this paper.
2. Just such a comprehensive approach to development is offered by Sen (1999), who conceives development as “the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy”. In order to operationalize these “freedoms”, he applies the concept of human capability, which relates to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have. Sen’s capabilities approach contrasts with narrower views of development that are largely restricted to income indicators.
3. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are the core Maghreb countries. However, also Mauritania and Libya are often seen as part of the region, and are member states of the Arab Maghreb Union.
4. Although 40,000 Riffians found employment in Franco’s army during the Spanish civil war and afterwards in Spanish Morocco, labour migration from Morocco to Spain was extremely limited. Until the 1960s, Spain itself remained a source of labour migrants to northern Europe and even to Algeria (López García, 1999).
5. Before 1973, the highest level legal constraint on migration was not immigration policies by European states, but the difficulty of obtaining a Moroccan passport. Nowadays, the situation is the reverse. One case illustrating the Moroccan government’s influence in setting migration itineraries is the chain of migration from the town of Settat (south of Casablanca) to Italy. Settat was the birthplace of the Driss
Basri, the powerful interior minister under King Hassan II, who boosted the development of his home town in various ways, not least by favouring locals by issuing them passports (Salih, 2001: 660-1).

6. The Moroccan state attempted to control its emigrant populations through a network of control and spy networks consisting of Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and government-controlled migrant associations such as the infamous Fédération des Amicales des Marocains, also known as “Amicales” or Widadiat in Arabic.

7. Others have placed this break-even point for in-out migration at income differentials of 3 to 4.5 (Böhning, 1994: 196; Olesen, 2002: 141)

8. Between 1948 and 2003, 270,188 Moroccan Jews migrated to Israel. In 2003, the Israeli population included 161,000 people born in Morocco, plus 335,000 people born in Israel to a Moroccan-born father (CBS Israel). Including Israeli children with a Moroccan-born mother, and 3rd generation Moroccan-Israelis, it is estimated that at least 700,000 people of Moroccan ancestry live in Israel (Personal communication with Sergio DellaPergola, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
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