Diasporas and Transnationalism

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Those of us who follow international migration are once again paying attention to transnational communities or, as we have now come to use this term, diasporas. The contexts of the discussions are many, an indication in itself of the new centrality of diasporas for us. These terms immediately connote homeland connections which is the main reason for our interest in them. But, whereas in previous years the academic interest in the immigrant diaspora was on the social and economic relations within the group, we are now seeing a growing interest in relations between diaspora groups and the members of the destination society. From one point of view, the tie to a homeland may be regarded as a counter force to full integration and citizenship in the society of destination. For societies that prefer temporary forms of residence, however, the draw of homeland might instil greater public confidence in a state’s immigration program. But the question has become whether internal diaspora relations affect the integration or degree of attachment that immigrants feel towards their new homes.

We hope that this issue of the *Metropolis World Bulletin* will help us to appreciate the wide scope of transnationalism and the policy implications of this phenomenon. Regardless of one’s particular take on these communities, it is crucial to understand how transnational communities function and what are their actual effects both upon destination societies and upon the homeland. Does maintaining strong homeland ties actually diminish the potential for social integration and accepting the responsibilities of membership in the destination society? Is dual loyalty problematic or might acceptance of dual citizenship in fact foster stronger allegiances to the host society? How are we to understand the frequently noted trend of circular migration and the causal relationship that this migration pattern bears to the diaspora? Of greatest concern to some now is whether a transnational community might support acts of terrorism or political insurgency, be those acts directed towards the host society or the homeland. The involvement of diasporas that are in fact involved in such activities includes the transmission of ideas or ideologies, the raising and transmission of funds, and operational support. Empirical research into these effects must be taken into account to determine whether there are, in fact, policy matters of urgency associated with diaspora.

Another emphasis of recent writings has been on the potential that diasporas have for providing benefits for both homeland and destination societies. Much of the current literature on migration and development places its hopes on diaspora communities who have shown their ability to mobilize effective development initiatives including community-based remittance transfers, technology transfers, facilitating investment and business development, and encouraging the development of democratic governance institutions in the homelands. The May 2006 report on international migration and development of the UN Secretary-General highlights the potential for transnational communities to support these sorts of development activities very effectively. Not only, then, might transnational communities be able to finance unrest in the homeland, but they might equally effectively be able to support peace making and sustainable development. This potential, from the perspective of the host society, suggests benefits of diaspora communities in implementing foreign policy and in domestic economic policy. And if members of these communities are able to play these roles within their adopted societies, this might indeed support those who believe that being an active member of a diaspora is not necessarily incompatible with being a fully committed citizen of the society to which one migrated.
As a Portuguese-speaker, born in Mozambique when it was still a Portuguese colony, you are, of course, part of the Lusophone diaspora. Is it realistic to think that the Lusophone community can be brought together and conceive of itself as a cohesive entity? What are the challenges given the diverse histories, origins, ethnicities and religions of Lusophones around the world? How can language alone bring people together?

In the wake of the recent Bissau meeting, the intergovernmental project of the Lusophone Community is perhaps passing through a decisive “make or break” moment which, given the commemorative nature of the date, marking 10 years since its launch, has almost inevitably and opportunistically taken the form of broader and wider media and civil society debate, reflection and taking stock of the dreams and ambitions that accompanied its birth, the difficulties and transformation suffered and realized along the way, the concrete achievements and failures, and the realistic potential of Lusofonia today. Whether the project succeeds or fails will not be a matter of the differences of ethnicity, culture or religion between the parties, any more than mere language is what holds them together. Governments, political and cultural elites, economic interest groups, and grassroots communities have different, overlapping and articulated conceptions, perceptions and aspirations of the advantages – real and symbolic – of such a project, of its complementarity and congruence with other regional and global international organizations, not to mention sub-national, civil society, associational and NGO networks, and transnational communities. The point, in short, is this: the Portuguese language, and the historical and cultural dimensions that it contains is a point of commonality that is instrumentalised both to forge a community of interest and to symbolise that community. It neither requires homogeneity, nor is it exclusive of other transversal and overlapping memberships. One significant factor, though, is how the cultural and the more narrow inter-governmental dimensions, which it seems to me are running at very different speeds and with different levels of commitment, inter-relate in sustaining the project of Lusofonia and the Lusophone Community.

In addition to being part of the Lusophone diaspora, you are also of Indian descent and a prominent member of the Muslim community. Some refer to this as an “intersection” of identities. How do you conceive of – or construct – your own self-identity from among these various elements?

I am Portuguese, Mozambique-born, Indian by origin, a Memon, a Gujerati, and a Muslim – these are overlapping identities, situationally interpellated and foregrounded and contextually articulated. There is no question of either / or; it is both silly and pernicious to enquire as to which is more fundamental or determinant.

Presently, we hear much concern about relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Do you think that there is a potential role for individuals such as yourself – individuals with transnational ties – to facilitate understanding between various communities? Do you see this happening already?

We hear a lot of nonsense about Muslims, some of it due to ignorance, and much due to islamophobia. Everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim, has a role to play in dispelling myths, correcting misunderstandings and fighting prejudice. Transnational individuals and communities can do much to disseminate information, promote an understanding of religion and culture in
the grassroots, everyday interaction in neighbourhoods and communities. Prejudice and discrimination, however, must be faced up to and redressed by host communities, states, institutions and societies at large. In this regard, transnational individuals have the advantage only of social and institutional insertion in multiple communities, and they should use it, but to demand redress for their co-religionists as citizens who are entitled to equal rights and protections. We must reject, however, the notion that Muslims have a special duty to prove their belonging or to obtain the understanding of their fellow citizens and society at large.

Recently, the Secretary-General of the United Nations suggested that diaspora or transnational communities should be mobilized to help in the development of their homelands. Remittance transfers, encouraging investment, and sharing knowledge about technology, the global economy and even democratic governance are all ways in which the diaspora might assist in development. Do you think there is promise here? What economic, political or cultural difference might the diaspora make to their countries of origin?

The importance of diaspora communities is something that many groups and nations have long been aware of and have taken advantage of in different ways and along different dimensions. In the case of Portugal, for example, the contribution of emigrant foreign currency remittances to the Portuguese economy is something that governments were well aware of and have factored into policies or political calculus since the 19th century. Indeed, the possible political importance of diaspora communities in shaping foreign policy – or at least in affecting public opinion or constituency lobbies towards the home nation – was well understood and clearly at work in the launch of the Congresses of the Portuguese Communities at the time of the Portuguese colonial wars. As for the role of exiles and students in the transmission of ideas, ideologies and practices, the term estrangeirado (literally, ‘foreignised,’ meaning foreign-minded natives), which exists in Portuguese cultural history, captures well societies’ ambivalence towards a process that diaspora communities also play, and play contradictorily. Culturally, diaspora communities can both syncretically innovate and puristically ossify popular religious traditions and beliefs, folkloric practices and nationalist ideologies in ways that render them vanguards of future change or archaeological remnants and depositories of the past. With the acceleration of globalization, population movements and communication flows, there are, at the same time, more players mobilising transnational linkages and a greater and more sophisticated body of academic reflection and policy formulation around such issues, and the promises and threats that it holds. One thing is for sure, though, whether the nation-state in the conventional sense survives or not, transnationalism, in the sense of multiple belongings and trans-nation-state articulations, is a feature of its present configuration. All of us would do well to factor it in to our calculations, policies, dreams and ambitions.

You are a businessman and president of the Banco Efisa, an international financial services company. Does having transnational links provide a competitive advantage in the global economy? Are these international ties important to help improve and grow your business? And do you see other businesses trying to make use of such linkages?

There is no doubt that, in an ever globalizing world – and this is happening very fast – that transnational links are very important for the success of any business. It is very much so in the world of financial services where I am involved, but also valid for those in other businesses.

I look at it as follows: from Portugal in the European Union and its insertion in the Lusophone countries; my already referred links through the ethnic Memon community back to the Indian diaspora which I am also part of through my parents’ heritage; and last but not the least the links which I also have as a Muslim in the Arab and Islamic world are all factors adding to my ability to interact in the Global Village in which we live.

Lastly, I would like to reemphasise the fact that that the diaspora have, in fact, a crucial importance for the country of origin as those members of the diaspora can help their respective homelands in many ways. It is important that there is a correct framework of incentives to stimulate investments from the diaspora in the homeland and which somehow also has an effect on the resident nationals by promoting a network of contacts between the two sides. In this way, the diaspora can influence the home country in many ways by bringing new, innovative and proven ideas and experiences in many fields, not only economic but also political and cultural, with a cross-fertilization effect that can benefit all concerned.

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Currently within policy circles at both national and international levels, mixed messages are being conveyed with regard to diasporas. Some agencies or government departments broadly see diasporas as good things to engage for various kinds of mutually beneficial activity; at the same time, others believe diasporas are potentially bad things that may do various kinds of harm to national societies. Who is saying what, and why now?

The word ‘diaspora’ derives from the ancient Greek diaspeiro, “to sow or scatter from one end to the other.” In keeping with this etymology, a diaspora is commonly defined as a self-identified ethnic group, with a specific place of origin, which has been globally dispersed through voluntary or forced migration.

Historians remind us that global diasporas themselves are nothing new, and that they have played important roles at various times and places in the past. Influential trading communities, religious institutions, cultural practices, political movements and migrant-homeland relations have developed within given diasporas and shaped consequential events around the world.

Following a surge in academic interest from the early 1990s through the present, it is widely recognized that diasporas have an enhanced presence on the world stage today. This changing position of diasporas arises for several reasons. It includes the fact that world-wide there has been a rise in migrant numbers over the past few decades (up to some 190 million at present). More people have moved from more places to more places; old diasporas have been replenished while new diasporas have been created.

Advanced technologies and lower costs surrounding travel and mobility, telephone calls, internet connectivity and satellite television have meant that dispersed groups can, with relative ease, stay in everyday, close contact with each other or with events in homelands and other diasporic locations. Regular and routine transnational practices of exchange (of people, money, resources and information) and mobilization (for business, religious, social or political purposes) within diasporic networks often ensure that common collective identities are maintained and enhanced. Also, over 25 years of multicultural or other diversity-positive policies in Western, migrant-receiving countries have meant that it has been widely acceptable for immigrants and their descendants to sustain culturally distinct practices and diasporic identities.

Until recently policy-makers on the whole have usually had little to say about the presence or activities of diasporas (although of course one must remember major political decisions such as the American internment of Japanese during WWII or longstanding government dialogues with the lobbies of various prominent diasporas). Particularly since the beginning of the 21st century, however, diasporas have climbed up various policy agendas. Depending on the government department or international institution concerned, this fairly new policy attention has been for different reasons calling for different measures.

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Diasporas are good?

By the mid- to late-1990s one of the most significant ways diasporas caught policy-makers’ attention was through sheer economic scale. For instance, the opening of China to investment – mainly from overseas Chinese – led some analysts to estimate that the combined equivalent GDP of the Chinese diaspora was perhaps as large as that of China itself. Probably the biggest wake-up call to the economic extent of diasporas came through the steep rise in the global value of remittances, alongside some countries’ growing dependency on them, as the 1990s progressed. During that decade global remittances far surpassed the sum of foreign aid. Now, according to the United Nations, the annual worth of official global remittances is estimated to be some $232 billion. The total value including unofficial remittance flows – money and goods sent through family, friends, and informal or semi-formal channels (such as hawala systems) – are thought to be much higher still.

Several states now recognize that important and productive political voices are found within national diasporas, and various structures have been created to take account of these.

These large sums have prompted various national government departments responsible for overseas assistance and international agencies such as the World Bank to seriously consider the potential of diasporas for supporting economic development and reducing poverty in their respective homelands. Hence a flurry of reports, conferences, consultations and policy recommendations has arisen in the last few years around the positive relationship between diasporas and development. These include discussions surrounding: how to lower costs around remittance transfers; how to encourage ‘productive’ uses of remittances (and how best to think about what ‘productive’ should actually mean); what are the best ways to create a ‘banking culture’ among migrants abroad and their families remaining at home; and what are the most effective ways local and national governments can support migrant hometown associations that seek to establish, finance and manage development projects in their places of origin.

Beyond remittances, there are various other diaspora-relevant policy discussions taking place. Under consideration are ways to ‘tap’ diasporas for more philanthropic funds and work supporting homelands, for instance in establishing educational institutions. Various schemes have been created to harness overseas professional networks in order to stimulate the transfer of their knowledge and experience gained abroad (that is, to facilitate brain circulation as a corrective to brain drain). Meanwhile, some migrant-sending countries have developed financial policies intended to reach-out and engage members of national diasporas (or at least their money) through expatriate-only incentives such as high interest foreign currency accounts, special bonds and tax exemptions for saving and investment.

Still other significant kinds of economic activity within various diasporas are being recognized, too. These include new modes of transnational ethnic entrepreneurship and migrants’ roles in facilitating international trade. Members of diasporas play important parts in creating migrant ‘spin-off’ industries such as supermarkets and breweries selling to migrants abroad, law firms and travel agencies specializing in migration overseas or ‘diaspora tourism’ of the homeland, cyber cafes linking home and away, films and TV programs distributed for consumption overseas and companies specializing in the export of traditional foods and medicines.

The European Commission, government departments like the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and international agencies such as the World Bank are all currently espousing new circular migration schemes as the way forward in creating ‘win-win-win’ scenarios (to benefit migrant sending countries, receiving countries and migrants themselves). Such schemes would effectively create new – albeit temporary? – diasporas managed by international agreements.

In these ways diasporas are at present considered to be good things, at least economically.

Diasporas are bad?

Quite clearly, in the security-gripped era since 9/11 diasporic identities and transnational relations have come to be viewed by many with suspicion. There have been growing fears of ideological fifth columns, terrorist sleeper-cells, and other enemies within. Dread of diasporas has manifested itself in policies surrounding Britain’s Terrorism Act (which outlaws 40 foreign political organizations), the United States Department of Homeland Security (which now oversees immigration issues) and the Patriot Act (which, through measures to combat international money-laundering and terrorist financing, has had far-reaching impacts on legitimate remittance industries).
Suspicion-by-association or knock-on questions of dual loyalty have underpinned negative views of diasporas (in particular, relating to Muslims from certain countries). For instance, while a 2005 MORI poll revealed some 70% of British Muslims say immigrants should pledge primary loyalty to, and integrate fully into, Britain, the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project suggests British Muslims have negative views of Western values, and generally that their attitudes resemble public opinion in Islamic countries in the Middle East and Asia more than in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. The former findings get little attention while the latter makes headlines and increases public worries of diasporic duplicity.

In addition to the bad reputation of diasporas predictably thrown up by security concerns, another unfavorable picture has been growing. Across Europe, ‘the failure of integration’ has emerged as a widespread and prominent public discourse. In Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, this discourse arises in response to alarming socio-economic indicators showing that specific migrant-origin minorities – now in their third generation since arrival – are characterized by low educational attainment, high unemployment, poor housing quality, overcrowding and residential segregation, poor health, and lack of socio-economic mobility. A concomitant public discourse suggests such groups are living in ‘parallel societies’ marked by linguistic separateness, their own discrete neighbourhoods, schools, places of worship, associations and spaces of leisure.

In each context there are observers who put the blame for ‘the failure of integration’ and ‘parallel societies’ directly on multicultural policies and ethnic minorities’ persistent homeland orientations. They argue that too much cultural preservation and too many maintained links to places of origin are responsible for the poor conditions surrounding immigrants and their descendants. One senior British city official recently suggested to me that, as she sees it, the cause of so many problems surrounding members of the largest ethnic group in her city is their ‘village mentality’ – explaining that by this she means their tendency to be more concerned with what’s happening back in their village of origin, and with their own continuing social status there, than with trying to be successful within their immediate locality in the UK.

In response to these issues, policies to foster ‘community cohesion’ (by way of promoting core national values) and mandatory immigrant integration (through courses and tests on national languages, laws and political structures and cultural practices) are being rolled out across Europe. Advocates of such policies say these are necessary in order to avoid ethnic conflicts and to ensure better social and economic outcomes for migrants; critics claim the policies are ‘neo-assimilationist’ and run counter to agreed ideals of valuing diversity. In any case, such cohesion and integration policies are largely premised on a view that diasporic identification and transnational practices tend to threaten social solidarity generally and the position of immigrants specifically.

In migrant-receiving countries, then, diasporas tend to be viewed with some concern, if not dismay, by many policy-makers, practitioners and the wider public.

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Good and bad?
In yet other quarters, the jury is still largely out concerning diasporas and their benefits or drawbacks.

For migrant-sending countries, their diasporas can cause political headaches. Often they might predominantly harbour politically critical or even radically oppositional views – which is why some governments resist extending to them too much in terms of citizenship or political participation. The long-distance nationalism maintained in many diasporas is sometimes of an entrenched, reactionary kind that has strong opinions about how politics should go without actually being there to engage democratically; this, too, may be resented in the homeland. Further, it is well known that many recent and current conflicts are rhetorically fuelled and concretely funded by diasporas.

However, sometimes it is members of diasporas who have also had key roles to play in processes of peace-making and post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn regions. Moreover, several states now recognize that important and productive political voices are found within national diasporas, and various structures have been created to take account of these through overseas voting, parliamentary representation or special departments for diaspora.

Foreign ministries, such as that in the UK, are currently looking to establish and develop relationships with diasporic representatives from numerous key regions for a range of reasons to do with bilateral relations, security, trade and development. Yet we know that sometimes such diasporic consultation can backfire: the United States government’s
Diasporas may well have created seriously misleading understandings of Iraq in the run-up to war.

Mixed views surround diasporic cultural production and consumption, too. There has been widespread concern (in Germany, for instance) that ethnic minorities largely dwell on their own cultural forms: this is especially conspicuous through the consumption of satellite television broadcast from respective homelands. However, it is evident that some of the most creative contemporary works in literature, music, film and other arts have been produced by members of diasporas and consumed by other diasporic members, by people in respective homelands and by wider publics internationally.

**Neither and both**

Diasporas receive public and policy-maker attention now as never before. Despite their positive dimensions, it is the perceived negative sides of diaspora that concern most. Now it is not just xenophobia that is reflected in many immigration debates, but a ‘diasporophobia’ too: that is, fear of not just the ‘foreignness’ of immigrants, but also of their ongoing ties abroad.

But it is overly simplistic to think of diasporas as a monolithic type of social formation, to see transnational ties as of one kind, and to believe that diasporic identifications imprint specific values and kinds of behaviour. The history, composition and activities of diasporas are highly complex and diverse. Within any diaspora – whether based on ethnic, national, religious or local origin – its members do not feel or act as one. There is always a wide range and degree of attachment. Even among single families within a particular diaspora, some members will want to praise, support and recreate the homeland, some will want to respect it yet get on with their local life, others will want to leave the homeland altogether behind. Further, opinions about identity and views of the homeland tend to cover a wide spectrum: the Jewish diaspora, for example, includes some of Israel’s strongest critics as well as its most trenchant supporters.

Through recognizing such diversity-within-diasporas, we can see that diasporic identifications and transnational practices are not necessarily antagonistic to immigrant integration. It is not a zero-sum game (i.e., the more transnational immigrants are, the less integrated or vice-versa). This is born out in recent research findings that demonstrate there is no direct correlation between the kinds and degrees of immigrant integration and the extent of transnational identification or activities (Snel et al. 2006).

In many ways, diasporas represent some of most prominent processes and features of our age. In addition to globalization and the complex inter-penetration of cultures, diasporas clearly demonstrate the rise of multiplicity – of cosmopolitanism, multiple cultural competences and assorted attachments. Regardless of class or provenance but exemplified perhaps most by migrants, it seems an increasing number of people today inhabit and express overlapping (if not competing) memberships of group, language, interest, nation and state. Yet it is rather prosaic just to say that we all – but especially diasporic peoples – have multiple identities. Some group affiliations or personal identifications are stronger or more binding than others, sometimes events (in the world, in national politics, in individuals’ lifecourse) trigger particular identifications to condition interests, decisions and actions more than at other times. To slightly rework the approach of Fredrik Barth: it is not the stuff or nature of the identification itself – in this case, the category of diaspora – on which we need to focus academic and policy attention, but the ways, times and contexts in which the identification becomes salient.

Although it may be somewhat exasperating to see that diasporas are so broadly seen as good in some parts of the policy world and as bad in others, it is certainly not surprising. There are a number of topics that cut across the sometimes competing agendas between government departments and among international agencies. Migration is inherently one of these.

So it is not so puzzling that international institutions, national ministries of the interior, departments for home security, foreign affairs and international development are taking different views of diasporas. That is practically in their nature, although from the outside we can continue to call for greater policy coherence and ‘joined-up government’. The generalizing messages they put out, however – especially those which might stoke ‘diasporophobia’ – should nevertheless be scrutinized.

**Select Bibliography**


The 1980s in Hong Kong was a decade simultaneously of soaring hopes and of deepening anxieties. The economy was strong as the territory benefited from the extraordinary manufacturing growth of its hinterland, south China’s Pearl River Delta. The property division was the largest sector on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and real estate prices, the core of much personal and corporate wealth, rocketed upwards, doubling in the second half of the 1980s and tripling in the giddy period between 1989 and 1994. At this rate, owners of modest apartment units could anticipate millionaire status in their equity holdings. But at the same time there were some dark clouds on the horizon threatening this frenzy of capitalist activity. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 had established a road map whose destination was uncertain. While the re-incorporation of Hong Kong into the Mainland was laid out, its implications for economic activity and personal freedoms were much more obscure. These anxieties were significantly aggravated by the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, rekindling memories of the violent disorder of the Cultural Revolution.

At the same time, Canada and other western nations were looking for enhanced trading and investment relationships with the ascendant economies of East Asia. Trade missions announced that Canada was unambiguously open for business. The liberalisation of immigration policy in the 1960s was followed in the 1970s and 1980s by the development of business immigration streams that became very popular among entrepreneurs and capitalists in Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan and Korea. Australia, New Zealand, and other nations saw the same opportunity and established their own competing business programmes, setting out the welcome mat for a wealthy middle-class, uneasy with the political winds of change in East Asia (Wong 2003).

Ambivalent migrants

Variously informed of their options by a legion of immigration consultants, a considerable middle-class exodus from Hong Kong picked up steam. In the decade from 1987 to 1997, emigration surged ahead from its historic levels; numbers rose 50 per cent in the second half of the 1980s, and doubled again in the first half of the 1990s, before retreating in the latter half of the decade. In the peak year of 1992, over 66,000 emigrants left Hong Kong (Li 2005). Canada was the principal beneficiary of this outflow and, in some years during the 1990s, more than 70 per cent of those departing Hong Kong landed in Canada. Initially, migrants joined earlier family members who had entered the country following the 1960s immigration reforms, but before long the newcomers were landing as economic migrants as a result of their own significant human capital and financial assets. For a decade Hong Kong became the leading single source of immigrants to Canada.

There was, however, considerable ambivalence among many of these migrants. They were torn in their decision-making; from interviews in Hong Kong in the early 1990s, Ronald Skeldon (1994) and his team suggested they were reluctant emigrants, for while they could see the geopolitical security and quality of life in destination countries, they also expected more substantial economic benefits would continue to be derived from East Asia rather than from the more mature, regulated and highly taxed economies of North America and Australasia. As a result, many economic migrants maintained their business interests in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta following their physical departure. Some became more passive business partners, some commuted regularly across the Pacific to tend to their business with short visits to their family in Canada, some sought to extend economic activity to their new homelands by opening import-export companies, some again strategised a temporary absence, just long enough to secure citizenship status overseas. Others of course made a clean break and sought to re-establish economic and family life in their new home.

A transnational population

As a result of these continuing active linkages across the Pacific, Hong Kong middle-class emigrants became quintessentially transnational, maintaining connections and shuttling back and forth between North America and East Asia. Three significant consequences followed from
this transnational status. First, geographically, they moved to the major gateway cities of Sydney, Auckland, San Francisco, Vancouver and Toronto. Proximity to an airport with fast connections to Asia was a significant advantage in each of these cities. So too was the pre-existence of a substantial ethnic Chinese population, permitting easier adaptation, while also providing a market for small business activity.

It is a requirement that business migrants landing as entrepreneurs develop a business in Canada, so the existence of a significant ethnic enclave offered a market for business activity, where difficulties in speaking English need not be a penalty. Purchase of an existing small business, a restaurant or travel agency, for example, would aid the supply of an instant revenue stream and provide the necessary evidence to immigration authorities that a bona fide economic venture had been established. But surveys suggest that the entrepreneurs under-estimated the challenge of working outside Hong Kong. The level of regulation was unfamiliar, the market weaker than expected, in part because so many entrepreneurs had the same idea, and the ethnic economy became saturated, and hyper-competition drove profit margins down to low levels (Ley 2006). While immigrants made their investments as required, their own economic success was limited, and there were many business failures.

But there was more to it than that. Many migrants knew that profit margins would be lower in Canada, and some, as we have seen, maintained economic activity in East Asia. While they owned a business in Canada, their expectations were low and their real energies were focussed elsewhere. This interpretation is supported by the rapid turnover of these businesses as soon as the necessary terms and conditions for immigration had been satisfied, when around half of the ventures were sold. Low profits, even losses, were regarded as simply part of the cost of securing citizenship. In a neo-liberal age, when seemingly everything has a financial value, the state had set a price for citizenship for business immigrants and, having paid it, the migrants continued they had kept their part of a business transaction. A second consequence of transnational ties, then, has been a dilution of entrepreneurialism in Canada.

A third consequence of transnational status is the existence of fragmented families, with the male household head living and working in East Asia while his family is resident overseas. While the far-flung nature of the Chinese family business network has often been praised, more recent scholarship is pointing to the unspoken suffering that sustains this patriarchal institution. Though well-provided for financially, and maintaining regular telephone contact, the wife and mother overseas becomes a single parent, managing a house and family in an unfamiliar environment, a status with considerable challenges and stress (Waters, 2002). Children too as they enter their teenage years may develop behaviour problems, especially in the minority of cases where both parents have re-connected in East Asia, leaving their off-spring relatively unanchored with guardians in Vancouver or Toronto.

**The myth of return?**

Many immigrants sustain a myth of return to their homeland, and for some it does indeed takes place. During the great European migration to the United States in the period from 1880 to 1930, estimates suggest that as many as a quarter to a third of immigrants caught a return boat to Europe. With much faster and relatively cheaper transportation today, return is a much simpler proposition. Estimates repeatedly identify more than 200,000 residents of Hong Kong who hold Canadian passports. Interviews and focus groups indicate that these returnees have left Canada primarily for economic reasons, anticipating more substantial incomes and better prospects for career development in East Asia (Ley and Kobayashi 2005). At the same time they recognise the superior quality of life, educational system and political freedoms that Canada offers. Truly transnational, many of them anticipate re-locating across the Pacific at some stage in the future, either for the education of their own children, or later at retirement. For them, the myth of return is not about moving back to their place of birth, but rather re-migrating to the land that offers superior opportunities once economic security has been achieved.

This transnational population has a sophisticated geographical strategy of repeated movement between distinct places in an extended territory that straddles two nation-states, according to the criteria they wish to optimise at different stages of the life cycle. They well exemplify the current global trend toward temporary and circular migration.

**References**


Background
Migration of Jews to Israel can be characterized as a returning diaspora, a feature quite unique in most other migratory movements. Although Israel has, for more than 2,000 years, served as the religious-cultural homeland for the Jewish people, prior to the 20th century, very few Jews had actually ever lived in the land of Israel. Indeed, at the turn of the 19th century, when the Zionist movement was established, less than 1 percent of Jewish people had lived in the land of Israel, but after the establishment of the Zionist movement Jews began migrating to the homeland from all corners of the globe. Currently, 58 years after the establishment of the state of Israel, about 40 percent of the world’s Jewish population lives in Israel.

The Israeli returning diaspora is characterized by several unique features. First, these immigrants feel an affinity with the destination society even prior to migration, and they often exhibit feelings of homecoming upon arrival. Second, the state of Israel and Israeli society are institutionally and ideologically committed to the successful integration of Jewish immigrants into the society. This is most evident in the supportive ways in which immigrants are received by governmental institutions and agencies, as well as by the friendly manner with which the public embraces them.

As a centre for a returning diaspora, Israel encourages the immigration of Jews, while discouraging the immigration of non-Jews. According to the Law of Return and the Law of Nationality, every Jew has a right to settle in Israel, and every Jewish immigrant can claim and obtain citizenship upon arrival in the country. Moreover, these immigrants are not referred to as immigrants but as “olim” – a term with a strong positive connotation meaning “going up.” To facilitate the successful integration of new immigrants to Israeli society, the government has assigned one ministry responsibility for migrant absorption and immigrant issues. Furthermore, the government of Israel sees itself as responsible for rescue operations of Jewish communities at-risk (see, for example, the recent rescue operations of the Ethiopian Jewish community).

The flows of immigrants to Israel
Jewish immigrants have arrived in Israel in a sequence of flows from practically all continents, beginning at the end of the 19th century and continuing to the present. Following Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, we distinguish here among five major periods of immigration to Israel:

1. Immigration prior to statehood (1948)
2. Mass immigration immediately after the establishment of the state (1948-1952)
3. Sporadic migration in the following three decades (1953-1989)
5. Sporadic immigration from Western countries and developed countries such as Argentina, France and the United States (1995-present)

Figure 1 shows yearly migration flows by continent of origin since 1948 when the state was established. Consistent with the “five periods” classification scheme, one can observe two peaks in immigration to Israel. The first peak was immediately after statehood (1948-1952), and the second peak followed the downfall of the former Soviet Union (1989-1995), as shown in Figure 1. Distinguishing among immigrants’ continents of origin allows us to detect changes in Israel’s social and ethnic composition that have occurred as a result of immigration. Two major geo-cultural groups are identified according to continent of origin; these are Jews of Asian or African (AA) origin (mostly Sephardim), and Jews of European or American (EA) origin (mostly Ashkenazim). When one compares these two groups, the latter is characterized by higher socio-economic status in terms of education, occupational status, income, wealth and standard of living. As will become evident, these socio-economic differences are rooted, at least in part, by the flows of the ‘returning diaspora’ to Israel.

The first wave of migration to Palestine (before the establishment of the state of Israel) came at the turn of the 19th century, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe. This
was largely an ideological migration aimed at establishing a homeland for the Jewish people. These early immigrants established the political, economic and civil institutions of the state-to-be. Naturally, these immigrants occupied the upper echelons of the social, cultural and economic institutions and constituted the elite of the newly founded state.

The second wave of immigrants arrived immediately after the establishment of the state of Israel. It was characterized by a significant influx of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, along with European survivors of the Holocaust. During this period, in the first five years after independence, Israel’s Jewish population more than doubled, rising from 600,000 to more than 1.5 million people. The combination of large-scale immigration by heterogeneous populations and a scarcity of resources had a significant effect on the socio-economic achievements of these immigrants, and the consequences of this period are still evident, even among second- and third-generation immigrants. However, the outcomes do vary depending on one’s origins. Research on immigrant assimilation in Israel suggests that the integration of European immigrants and their children has been more successful than the integration of immigrants and their offspring who arrived from Asian and North African countries. We will expand on this later in the article.

Immigration in the third period was quite scattered and sporadic. It was mostly a result of political, economic and social events in specific countries of origin. For example, the Iranian revolution and political unrest in South Africa or Argentina were followed by respective waves of Jewish immigrants from Iran, South Africa and Argentina. Likewise, changes in immigration restrictions in Eastern European countries led to an increase in the number of immigrants from post-communist countries, especially from the former Soviet Union. In this period, the rate of immigration was relatively low, and government resources had increased. In general, the socio-economic status of these immigrants was relatively higher than in the previous periods, and empirical research suggests that the rate of integration of these immigrants was quite high.

The turning point in immigration to Israel was in 1989. Following the erosion of the former Soviet Union, a massive wave of emigrants began an exodus from the Soviet republics. Israel was the primary viable destination for these Jewish emigrants and, as a result, Israel – a country with a population of 4.5 million – was faced with more than 700,000 immigrants (400,000 of whom arrived between 1989 and 1991). The overwhelming majority of these immigrants were of Jewish ancestry, but non-Jewish family members also arrived as immigrants. This wave of immigrants was highly educated, and most had academic and professional degrees. Studies on the integration of these “Russian” immigrants indicate that most experienced downward occupational mobility upon arrival, but considerable upward occupational and economic mobility with the passage of time. At the same time, immigrants from Ethiopia arrived in Israel, many of whom were rescued in two major army operations. At
present, about 100,000 Ethiopian immigrants and their offspring live in Israel; their socio-economic status is very low, and they face severe difficulties in adjusting and integrating into Israeli society.

Since 1995, after the influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union had ended, immigrants to Israel have arrived primarily from Western and economically developed countries. About 50,000 immigrants have arrived in this period from the United States, Canada, France and Argentina. These are, for the most part, highly educated and highly skilled immigrants, and these immigrants, while motivated mostly by ideological and religious reasons, do have choices. Unlike many other immigrants, this returning diaspora has the option of returning to their countries of origin if they are unsuccessful in Israel. Although it is too early to assess their integration into society, we have reason to believe that they are likely to face social and economic success.

An examination of these five periods shows the ways in which Israel’s returning diaspora have changed over time. Not only that, but their numbers have increased as a result of the creation of an Israeli state. Table 1 shows the number of immigrants who arrived in Israel prior to and after the establishment of the state. It is clear that Israel is the homeland of a “returning diaspora.” In 2006, the Jewish population in Israel numbered 6,869,500; nearly 50% are foreign-born and much of the other is comprised of the children of first-generation immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>482,857</td>
<td>2,971,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>377,381</td>
<td>1,790,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America/Oceania</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>234,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>40,895</td>
<td>425,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td>489,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>52,786</td>
<td>31,653</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Israeli National Bureau of Statistics

The Role of the State

Israel views itself as the homeland of the Jewish people and is thus committed to successfully integrating its returning diaspora into the social system. Other immigration societies (including the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada and Australia), tend to view the incorporation of immigrants into society in terms of assimilation into a market economy. The assumption underlying this model is that immigrants enter at the bottom of the stratification system and, with the passage of time, acquire the social, cultural and human capital resources that enable them to compete on equal grounds and to achieve parity with native-born citizens. In other words, it is assumed that with the passage of time, immigrants in a market society will compete equally and will thus receive equal returns on their work-related resources. According to this model, the rewards obtained in the labor market reflect human capital resources and the degree of assimilation in the host society.

The market model of immigration is somewhat problematic in the case of Israel, given that Israel views its immigrants as a returning diaspora. Throughout most of its history, decision-making in Israel has been highly centralized, and the state has been intensively involved in shaping the opportunity structure and immigration policies that will facilitate a smooth incorporation of immigrants into society. That is, the state has played a central role in the incorporation and absorption of immigrants, largely as a result of the provision of settlement assistance to new immigrants in the first years after arrival. This assistance includes stipends and language instruction, free housing for several months and subsidies for the purchase of homes, job training and employment services, as well as tax exemptions. From this perspective, the state of Israel has established a “social contract” with new immigrants.

Indeed, the involvement of the state is aimed at facilitating the smooth transition of its returning diaspora into the host society. At the same time, however, it also creates a dependency on the state system and state institutions. Furthermore, in many cases, state actions have had detrimental and long-term consequences for the social and economic status of immigrants. Based on this, Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein proposed a typology-model that includes two major dimensions important for assessing the impact of the state on the emergence of ethnic inequalities among immigrants to Israel. The two dimensions are:

1. The degree of state control and the degree of immigrants’ dependence on its institutions and agencies; and
2. The amount of resources provided to immigrants by the state.

These two dimensions have varied considerably over time, and this has shaped the system of ethnic stratification among immigrants in Israeli society. Table 2 (adopted from Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein) presents a somewhat simplified two-dimensional model. The first dimension pertains to societal resources, while the second dimension represents the level of state control (as opposed to market control, which is also related – inversely – to immigrants’ dependency on the state).

According to the model presented in Table 2, the pre-state period is characterized by a low level of societal resources and a low level of centralized control. On the other hand, the years immediately following Israel’s war for independence – the period of mass refugee migration –
were characterized by scarce societal resources and a high level of state control. During this period, immigrants became extremely dependent on state agencies and policies. For example, the state developed new housing projects for arriving immigrants and developed a policy of population dispersion that reflected the needs of the new state. As a result, immigrants – mostly those arriving from North Africa – were directed to the newly created development towns in the peripheral regions of the state. Concomitantly, new industries were developed in these towns, which offered primarily low-paying jobs in labor-intensive industries. To date, these towns are still characterized by limited industrial and occupational structure and a high concentration of North African immigrants. This settlement arrangement has had long-lasting consequences for second- and third- generation immigrants. Immigrants from Central Asia and especially from North Africa, as well as their sons and daughters, are still lagging far behind European and American immigrants and their offspring, whether one looks at education, occupational status, earnings or standard of living.

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, while the rate of immigration to Israel had declined, resources for immigrants’ absorption substantially increased. At the same time, state involvement in immigration policy as well as government assistance remained intensive, and immigrants arriving in this period had greater socio-economic opportunities (due, in part, to less pressure in the job and housing markets). Indeed, studies on immigrants in Israel reveal that this returning diaspora has closed the socio-economic gap between itself and the Israeli-born population and, in effect, has reached parity with all other advantaged groups.

The period of mass immigration from the former Soviet Union (1989-1995) was characterized by a high level of resources, but a low level of state control. A new policy on immigrants’ absorption – “direct absorption” – had been established and, according to this policy, newly arrived immigrants receive an “absorption basket” of cash and services and can adopt various strategies for labor market incorporation. For example, they can use the resources and assistance allocated by the state for training and for residence, and they can choose where to live and when and how to join the labor market. This policy has continued, for all practical purposes, into the fifth period of immigration (1996-2006) in which immigrants from Western and economically developed countries are arriving in Israel. Research findings on absorption and incorporation of the “Russian immigrants” indicate a slow but monotonous improvement in their socio-economic status and achievements, especially among younger immigrants. However, it is important to note that Ethiopian immigrants, who also arrived in Israel during this period, continue to severe difficulties in Israeli society. Apparently, an immigration policy that successfully serves highly educated immigrants and immigrants from developed and industrialized societies cannot necessarily be applied to immigrants who might lack the human capital attributes and cultural orientation that is needed to compete successfully in a society such as Israel.

Conclusions

In this article, we have outlined and delineated the unique features of Jewish immigration to Israel throughout the last century. Unlike other migratory movements, Jews have arrived in Israel as a returning diaspora and are viewed as such by both the public and the state. As a returning diaspora, they are entitled to citizenship upon arrival, and they receive considerable financial and moral support to facilitate their successful incorporation into society. Thus, unlike other “market oriented” immigrant-receiving societies, the state of Israel has played – and is still playing – a major role in the incorporation of immigrants into society. It is our contention that without such state interventions, the incorporation of this very large number of immigrants – many of whom arrived as refugees and with limited resources – over a relatively short period of time, would have been considerably less successful.

Sources


For the Italian diaspora, 2006 has already been a significant year, with at least two influential events to date. The first was the Italian election in April which saw, for the first time, the participation of Italians living abroad, while the second was the World Cup of Soccer hosted by Germany in June and July. Although this article will focus on the former, it is difficult not to notice the pervasive force the latter had to stir allegiances, arouse nationalist emotions and bring together first-, second- and even third-generation Italians around the globe. Such is the power of soccer to create a common bond and a shared sense of identity, overshadowing the effect of institutional (transnational) politics. So, it might be insightful to take a little detour – meandering between soccer balls and ballot forms – to shed some light on the evolving relationships between Italy and its diaspora.

This year for the first time, an electorate of around 2.7 million Italian citizens living outside the geographical boundaries of the state – the consequence of over hundred years of emigration during which 26 million people left the Italian peninsula and its adjacent islands – had the opportunity to cast a vote in the national political election, and 42.07% did so. Except for the novelty of the event, there does not appear to be anything extraordinary about it.

Recent debates in migrant political transnationalism (Baubock 2003, Smith 2003, Portes 1999) have highlighted how the emergence of ties and networks across national borders redefine the relationships between the state and migrant communities abroad, reconfiguring the boundaries of the social and political community. Usually this includes emigrants in a more open conception of the sending country’s nation (Smith 2003). Thus, as an expression of transnational membership, external voting rights have become an accepted practice. Although countries’ attitudes towards it may vary, it is not an unusual to grant expatriated citizens the right to vote though the introduction of absentee ballots. However, very few countries have a far-reaching scheme of democratic representation for external citizens as has been established in Italy by amending articles 48, 56 and 57 of the Constitution and introducing law n. 459, which came into effect in December 2001.

Italian citizens abroad not only have the right to cast a vote for political elections, but also to elect their own representatives. There are 18 seats set aside in parliament for the migrant constituencies: 6 senators and 12 representatives to the Chamber of Deputies elected in the four global electorate districts: Europe; Southern America; North and Central America; and Africa, Asia, Oceania and Antarctica.

Approval of these bills and the creation of these unusual districts – the result of a lengthy process and prolonged political debate – have raised much perplexity and curiosity internationally. Three issues will be briefly addressed here: the circumstances that brought the districts into place; some of the prominent arguments that arose during the debate; and some outcomes.

In January 2003, an Italian special investigative parliamentarian delegation toured Australia to meet Italian communities. During the Sydney encounter, the outspoken Franca Arena, formerly a New South Wales Member of Parliament of Italian origin, briskly voiced the concern of many attendees, asking what the purpose and necessity of this far reaching scheme of democratic representation was, given more than 50 years had past since the post-World War II wave of Italian migration.

However, the time lag should not come completely as a surprise. Sending states’ policies towards emigrants might be driven by strategic reasons; indeed, they are often a reaction to the diaspora’s ability to make demands, as well as a result of the patterns of ethnic communities’ formation in the countries of settlement (Baubock 2003; Portes 1999). In other words, as Portes puts it “[s]ending] governments enter the picture as the importance of the phenomenon becomes [or is perceived as] evident” (1999, 466-7), rather than being initiated by grass-roots transnationalism. Thus, it is only through the consolidation of Italian communities
and their positions around the world, as well as changed attitudes in the countries of settlement, that Italian diaspora – or at least their political elites – have been able to better articulate their demands towards the Italian state. Ironically, this has occurred at a time when diaspora communities are ageing and their numbers are not being replenished by recent arrivals.

Obviously, there are a number of concomitant factors. As Colucci (2001) has noted, between 1976 and 1982, the ruling Christian Democrat party was quite activist, and several bills on external migrant voting rights were presented in Parliament in an attempt to win moderate votes among emigrants; this occurred as communists were gaining ground in the national political arena. It can be added, however, that the end of Italian emigration in the mid-1970s – a consequence of a period of rapid economic growth which, albeit uneven through the peninsula – changed living standards and saw a shift towards internal and return migration. The wave of return migration furthermore supported the consolidation of emigrant organisations headquarters in Italy (Pugliese 2003).

Arguments in favour of – and also against – external voting rights and their modalities have not changed much since inception of the discussion in republican Italy. Even during the last political and parliamentary debate, which spanned more than a decade, there were two main thrusts, which offer some insight into the rationale for such democratic representation. On the one hand, there is an argument centred on discourses of memory, sentiment and reward for the hardship emigrants have endured, as well as their contribution – through remittances – to their country of origin. On the other hand, there is the argument that external voting rights provide an opportunity to foster trade and gain internationally privileged positions through close networks with Italian communities and their descendants. These are, key points in the manifesto “Azzurri nel mondo” (Azzurri in the World) of the party of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia 2003), a position largely shared across the political spectrum.

It is arguable that this “experiment,” as the external representation is often called, will fulfil the latter objectives. Without a doubt, the latest extra-territorial electoral campaign has strengthened the public transnational sphere of the Italian diaspora, fostering links and ties between Italian political institutions, parties and diaspora. Yet, the interest and participation seem to have been limited and mostly confined to the most politicized segments of the migrant population and especially in the first-generation (Aird 2006). As Senator Villone stated in an interview, “[Italian institutions] should find the means, and this is what we lack, to teach to the second-generations a way of being Italian. Instead, all we are doing towards emigration speaks more to the old than the new” (2005).

Certainly, having obtained external voting rights will play a minor role in nurturing the second-, third- and sometimes even first-generation’s sense of Italian-ness and civic responsibility towards the country of origin, and it is not clear why it should anyway. At the time of completing this article, this was strikingly in contrast with the enthusiasm, participation and nationalist sentiments aroused by the World Cup, both for Italians in Italy and around the world.

Like many first-, second- and third-generation Italians, this author was a regular in Leichhardt — Sydney’s alleged little Italy – during the World Cup. In a vibrant, emotionally charged atmosphere at improbable hours in the morning, thousands of young people wrapped in red, white and green flags wearing “Azzurri” t-shirts packed the streets of Leichhardt screaming “C’mon Italia, go Azzurri.” Definitely, the much celebrated victory further boosted a sense of pride about being “Italian,” at least for a few days.

Interestingly, if external voting rights and extra-territorial constituencies have not made a major impact in the everyday lives of the Italian diaspora and their descendants, they have, with five senators elected among the winning Centre Left coalition, at the very least, had a fundamental role in securing a majority in the senate by two seats.

As an expression of transnational membership, external voting rights have become an accepted practice.

References


Sydney is Australia’s largest, most multicultural city with 58% of its population of 4 million people identifying in 2001 as first- or second-generation immigrants. Sydney today is the world in one city and, consequently, the home of a vast array of immigrant diasporas. In a seminal study of diasporas, Robin Cohen describes a number of characteristics of diasporas, or, as he puts it, ‘fibres of the diasporic rope’ (1997: 184).

Referring to two of Sydney’s largest diasporas, the Chinese diaspora and the Lebanese diaspora, this paper argues – based on the Sydney experience – that diasporas are also changing, complex and racialised as a result of events at the local, national and international level.

Changing patterns of Chinese and Lebanese immigration and settlement

Chinese immigrants have a long history in Australia dating from the Gold Rush of the 1850s. The first immigration legislation in Australia was designed explicitly to reduce Chinese immigration and, indeed, the white Australia policy was a key foundation stone of the new Australian nation at Federation in 1901. Immigration of ethnic Chinese dropped off significantly until the end of the white Australia policy, which permitted a substantial immigrant intake of ethnic Chinese refugees who were escaping Vietnam after the fall of Saigon in 1975. In recent decades, ethnic Chinese immigrants have come to Australia in large numbers, but estimates of the size of the diaspora have been constrained by the fact that Census birthplace data do not equate to ethnicity; the Chinese diaspora might have been born in mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Fiji, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada or other countries. However, the 2001 national census did collect ancestry data, which indicate that there were 248,579 people in Sydney who claimed Chinese ancestry; this is nearly half of all of Australia’s population of Chinese ancestry. Most of these (227, 449) had parents who were both born overseas, indicating how recent a large part of Sydney’s contemporary Chinese diaspora is.

Sydney’s Chinese diaspora is today comprised of people with very different paths to settlement in Australia. Australia’s Chinese immigrants in the past two decades are more likely to arrive under the skilled, independent stream and are very much unlike the Indo-Chinese humanitarian entrants and family reunion streams of the 1970s and 1980s. Chinese immigrants since the 1990s generally possess professional or highly skilled education qualifications, good English language ability and earn higher than average incomes. Moreover, second-generation ethnic Chinese have higher than average rates of tertiary education in Australia.

In the 1880s, a group of Lebanese Christians from the Bekka Valley settled in the Sydney inner-city suburb of Redfern, but most Lebanese migration to Australia occurred in the post-1945 period. Until the early 1970s, when the immigration of Muslims from Lebanon began, most Lebanese immigrants were Christians involved in what Burnley (2001: 198) has called village chain migration. At the 2001 national census, there were 107,000 first- and second-generation Lebanese immigrants living in Sydney, which is more than 70% of the total Australian Lebanese diaspora. Lebanese immigrants have lower than average incomes, but higher rates of entrepreneurship and unemployment than the Australian average (Collins 2005).2 Within the Lebanese population, Muslim Lebanese have lower incomes and higher unemployment rates that Christian Lebanese, while second-generation Lebanese are more likely to be employed in professional, managerial and skilled occupations and have lower unemployment rates than the first-generation. Nonetheless, second-generation Lebanese are under-represented in the tertiary sector of Australian education.
The Lebanese diaspora demonstrates more concentrated settlement patterns in Sydney than the Chinese diaspora. Most Lebanese live in Sydney’s southwestern suburbs. Muslim Lebanese tend to live in the Bankstown and Canterbury local government areas – where they comprise 13% and 11% of the total population respectively – while Christian Lebanese have settled in the Parramatta local government area. Chinese settlement is much more dispersed, with concentrations in southwestern Sydney, the Central Business District and Chatswood on Sydney’s wealthier north shore. The Chinese and the Lebanese diaspora are not homogenous, and different elements of both diasporic communities attempt to gain influence and power through a range of community and religious organisations. For example, there are more than 100 ethnic Chinese community organisations in Sydney, often clan associations. Compare this to the Lebanese Muslim population, where groups associated with various mosques vie for power and representation on government bodies and community organisations.

Changing patterns of diasporic racialisation
While both diasporic groups are racialised immigrant minorities with histories dating back to the mid-19th century, the dynamics of this racialisation have changed over time as the patterns, and characteristics, of Chinese and Lebanese immigration and settlement have changed. Traditionally, the Chinese have been the racialised ogre among Australian immigrant communities, and there are many examples of anti-Chinese hostility. Recent examples include the anti-Asian immigration debate in the early 1980s (the Blaïney debate); the bicentenary of white settlement in 1988 (when John Howard, then the federal Opposition Leader and now the Prime Minister, promised to reduce Asian immigration if elected); and finally the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in the mid-1990s, which captured national and international attention with its anti-Asian immigration stance. These racialised discourses constructed a negative, homogenous notion of ‘Chinese-ness’ that is at odds with the great heterogeneity evident amongst Sydney’s Chinese diaspora.

One prominent aspect of this racialised discourse is the criminality that was alleged to be part of Chinese culture. The history of Sydney’s Chinatown (Fitzgerald, 1997), as in other Chinatowns in western cities (Kinfayd, 1993), is in part the history of gambling, opium dens and prostitution. In recent decades, attention focused on Chinese criminal gangs (Triads) involved in drug smuggling to Australia and, more recently, people smuggling (the ‘snakeheads’ and illegal migration). In the last decade, the ethnic crime debate in Sydney has shifted the focus from Chinese Triads towards criminal gangs involving males of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ (Collins et al. 2000). Since 1998, a series of criminal events – including murder, drive-by shootings, and illegal immigration – have linked by the media and politicians to Lebanese and Middle Eastern youth and criminal gangs. On top of this localized criminal discourse, international events – including 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings – have associated Middle Eastern males with the most extreme form of criminal, the terrorist. The complexities and differences within Sydney’s Lebanese diaspora disappeared under a media-driven moral panic that promoted a discourse whereby the criminality of individuals became the criminalization of a culture. In this discourse, members of Sydney’s Lebanese diaspora are always ‘Lebanese’ or ‘Middle Eastern’ and never ‘Australian’ with calls for their religious and community leaders to take ‘their’ youth into hand and solve the crime problem that was not ‘our’ problem but ‘theirs’ (Poynting et al 2004).

While both diasporic groups are racialised immigrant minorities with histories dating back to the mid-19th century, the dynamics of this racialisation have changed over time as the patterns, and characteristics, of Chinese and Lebanese immigration and settlement have changed.

Diversity and difference in the diaspora
Although the racialised stereotypes of Chinese or Lebanese immigrants lump them together into a broader category of Asian or Middle Eastern immigrants with homogenized (often criminalized) characteristics, Sydney’s Chinese and Lebanese diasporas are, in fact, very diverse and complex. There are many differences within both communities, unsettling any notion of homogeneity. At the most obvious level, the Chinese or Lebanese millionaire and his or her family are very different from the undocumented Chinese or Lebanese immigrant washing dishes in a Chinese or Lebanese restaurant or working on a building site. In a similar way, the Chinese or Lebanese entrepreneurs in Sydney are very different from professionals or unemployed members of both diasporas. Other differences result from the region of origin in the homeland or, in the case of the ethnic Chinese who are often second or third time migrants, country of birth or residence before migrating to...
Australia; religion; class background; category of immigration (business, family, humanitarian, skilled); and period of migration to Australia. Post-migration factors also have an impact and may include: geographical settlement patterns in Sydney; political orientation and allegiance in Australia and the homeland; labour market status; and membership in various ethnic associations or mosques, churches, temples. Intergenerational issues add to this complexity as the Australian-born and educated second-generation take advantage of opportunities and relationships not available to their parents.

It is clear from this brief overview of Sydney’s Lebanese and Chinese diasporas that the experience of individuals within each diaspora are increasingly complex and uneven. Indeed, new patterns of immigration and settlement, as well as changing circumstances in Australia and the home country, have increased the diversity of these two diasporic communities. Nonetheless, racialised discourses cover the tracks of this difference and diversity, constructing instead images of homogenized communities and cultures across ever expanding geographic regions (Asia, the Middle East), which deny difference and promote (mostly negative) stereotypes (such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Middle Eastern’ appearance). This devalues the important contribution that these and other immigrant diasporas make to economic, social, political and cultural life in Sydney. These racialised discourses and practices have changed over time, as evident in the way that local, national and international events have, in recent years, constructed a discourse of criminality and terrorism on the Lebanese diaspora, which simply did not exist a decade or two ago. At the same time, the anti-Asian immigration debate has softened as the immigration net has focused on highly educated professionals, and the fear of Chinese and Asian criminality has been overtaken by fears of Middle Eastern crime.

References

Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora Expert Forum

As communities worldwide have begun to focus more systematically on how to harness diversity as an asset rather than a liability, there has been increased interest from many quarters in tapping the creativity, energy and resources of diaspora to build peace and promote development. At the same time, there is a lack of thorough and in-depth understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing the diaspora as well as a limited utilization of diaspora potentials for peace and development both in the country of origin and adopted homelands. Against this backdrop, the University for Peace is organizing a high-level expert forum on “Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora.” It will take place in Toronto, Canada, from October 19 to 20, 2006. The Forum will bring together approximately 70 expert participants from around the world for in-depth discussion. Participants will include senior government officials, representatives of international and civil society organization, and researchers.

For more information on this event, please visit the conference web site: www.toronto.upace.org/diaspora/index.html

International Migrants and the City

International Migrants and the City is a new book, jointly published by UN-HABITAT and the Università IUAV di Venezia, which gives an account of how the issue of international migration is being addressed in an urbanizing world. The volume reviews the policies and practices of ten cities, including Bangkok, Berlin, Dakar, Johannesburg, Karachi, Naples, São Paulo, Tijuana, Vancouver and Vladivostok. Key issues include the impact of national policies on international migration, the role of migrants in the local economy, the relationship between local and migrant communities, and migrants’ use of urban space. It reveals the importance and the advantages of promoting communication between stakeholders and establishing channels for representation and participation of migrants in decisions affecting their livelihoods.

To download a copy, visit the Publications section of the UN-HABITAT website: http://www.unchs.org/pmss/
There is increasing recognition of the potential for international migration to stimulate development in countries of origin among multilateral agencies, national governments and development agencies. This debate has focused on the impact of remittances on poverty alleviation, (in)equality, investments and economic growth in migrant sending countries. Research has pointed to the development potential of migration, while stressing the sheer diversity of migration impacts across space and time.

Presumably urged by the spectacular surge in remittances – which now amount to well over two times the amount of official development assistance and to tenfold the amount of net private capital transfers to developing countries – an increasing need is felt to integrate migration into development policies. However, this coincides with a one-sided focus on the importance of remittances for national accounts and their potential role in enabling business investments. Consequently, as far as migration and development policies have been implemented in practice, they tend to focus on measures to facilitate and channel remittances into formal channels.

This goes along with a comparative neglect of the important micro-level contribution of remittances to development in migrant sending societies. Firstly, the at least US$ 126 billion in registered North-South remittances are primarily sent between individuals and families. These transfers have significant direct poverty reducing and welfare-increasing effects. Secondly, consumption and so-called non-productive investments such as in houses – which tend to receive a bad press – can have significant positive multiplier impacts on economic growth and employment in migrant sending regions and countries.

Furthermore, migrants contribute to development in countries of origin in many ways other than by sending remittances alone. In many emigration countries, migrants play an important role in the political debate, civil society, the enabling and encouraging of education for non-migrants, and the emancipation of women and minority groups in countries of origin. Such forms of transnational economic, social and civic engagement seem to acquire an increasingly collective dimension, which is exemplified by the establishment of ‘diaspora associations’ that explicitly aim to foster links with the countries of origin, to provide small-scale aid or to set up development projects.

It is not just governments of countries of origin that have recently shown an increasing interest in including migrants and their organisations in plans for national development. Local and national governments of the main receiving countries in Europe and North America, as well as development agencies and multilateral organisations, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), are also exploring possibilities for supporting and strengthening the engagement of migrants and diaspora organisations in the development of origin countries.

However, policy-makers often have difficulty turning the stated priority for development issues into concrete action. Valuable lessons can be drawn from past and current experiences with the implementation of such initiatives. On the basis of a recent comparative study of policies pursued by multilateral organisations (such as the World Bank, IOM and the United Nations Development Program) as well as governments and development agencies in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and a range of other countries, it is possible to identify four broad areas in which development agencies and governments can support and strengthen the engagement of migrants and diaspora groups in the social and economic development of origin countries:

1. **Facilitating and reducing costs of remittances.** This is the most tangible and therefore least problematic area of policy intervention. However, the only feasible way to serve the interests of migrants is to improve the banking system rather than to clamp down on the informal system without creating viable alternatives.
Policies that try to channel remittances into productive investments are not only patronising and neglectful of the potentially positive impacts of consumption and ‘non-productive’ investments but they are also bound to fail as long as general investment conditions do not improve.

2 **Supporting migrants to set up small enterprises in countries of origin and facilitating ‘brain circulation.’** Repeated experiences have shown that such programmes are unlikely to succeed if they focus on or are conditional upon return. More promising results have been achieved by the Dutch IntEnt projects for migrant entrepreneurs and by UNDP’s long-standing TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) programme to facilitate ‘brain circulation.’ Importantly, both programmes avoid imposing a return conditionality.

3 **Supporting collective development projects initiated or implemented by diaspora organisations or individual migrants.** It has proven difficult to put this idea into practice. For projects to succeed, it seems important that development agencies do not stipulate the kind of projects to be funded but rather link up with existing initiatives of migrants. Co-funded projects that have been selected through an open tendering system have generally been more successful than ‘co-opted’ projects based on 100 percent funding. The successful French-Moroccan example of the Migrations et Développement associations demonstrates that a successful implementation of projects should evolve from a long learning process and from a thorough knowledge of local contexts and cultural sensitivities.

4 **Supporting diaspora networks and capacity building of diaspora organisations along with creating durable alliances with governments and established development agencies.** Government or agency-led efforts to ‘engineer’ consultative bodies or migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to create such alliances. A more fruitful strategy seems to support existing, spontaneously created diaspora organisations or networks, such as Afford (African Foundation for Development) in the United Kingdom, which have already gained legitimacy through their role in development and advocacy of migrant rights and interests. However, there is a delicate balance between strengthening and patronising diaspora organisations.

In general, it would be a mistake to assume that diaspora groups and their members should be taught how to ‘do’ development or how best to spend their remittances. Diaspora organisations have survived independently for many years; any attempt to patronise or to state ‘what is best for them’ would appear to be a recipe for failure.

An important point of departure for implementing successful policies is the recognition that migrants are already mobilised for development on their own initiative. Rather than ‘mobilising diasporas,’ governments and development agencies themselves should be ‘mobilised’ to engage with and to learn from diasporas in development cooperation so as to establish a genuine two-way working relationship.

In the context of the current ‘euphoria’ on migration, remittances and development, it is also essential to set realistic expectations through increasing awareness of past experiences and studies that show migration is no panacea for development. Migration and remittances alone cannot overcome structural development obstacles such as corruption, political instability and an unfavourable investment climate. Expectations must therefore be set more realistically so as to avoid disappointment and the subsequent abandonment of the migration and development agenda.

Governments and development agencies should avoid setting double agendas. Diaspora organisations are unlikely to cooperate with development policies whose hidden agenda is to curb migration through development. This is not only an unrealistic aim, but it will also almost certainly lead independent migrants and their organisations to shun cooperation with governments and development agencies.

More in general, it is unlikely that increasing coherence between development cooperation and migration policies can be achieved by subordinating the first policy area to the second. All too often, the stated development intentions of migration and development policies have camouflaged a hidden agenda of stimulating return migration. Paradoxically, restrictive immigration policies force migrants into permanent settlement and impede circular movement, with potentially negative consequences for the transnational engagement of diaspora groups.

**References**


The Mexicans are coming…and they have already arrived! They are equally at home in the farmlands of sunny California and amid the skyscrapers of New York City, from the frigid farmlands of the Dakotas to the sunny southern beaches of the Gulf coast. Immigrant workers from south of the border have made a place for themselves in the top ten cities of the United States, as well as in virtually every village and town of the heartland, from sea to shining sea.

Having witnessed firsthand the difficulties and challenges that have forced Mexican workers to leave friends and home to seek employment in the United States, I understand why Mexican President Vicente Fox called them “heroes – our brightest and best!” Indeed, the overwhelming majority of these immigrants are good people, honest and hardworking, full of life and laughter, faith and love. I have worked with them and admired them on both sides of the border, before and after they became immigrants to the U.S.

Critics of undocumented or illegal immigrants are quick to point out that they are breaking American law and thus are “criminals.” However, these critics or either unaware, or they fail to note, that U.S. immigration laws with respect to Mexico are arbitrary, inadequate, and unrealistic. Take, for example, the current limit of 20,000 permanent resident visas per year, which is ridiculously small given that Mexico is a peaceful border country of just 105 million people and is linked to the U.S. by treaty. The result is that a Mexican seeking legal documents to enter the U.S. faces a waiting list in the thousands and an average processing time that is measured in years.

As a result, it is estimated that each year, approximately 1.3 million Mexicans try cross the American border without proper documents. Without minimizing the fact that laws are broken, I must note that these are people who simply want a job. Indeed, as U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez recently said, “Unlike in Europe, where many immigrants come for the welfare system, [Mexican migrants] come here for one reason: to work.” Nonetheless, approximately one million migrants are caught trying to cross the border each year, with approximately 300,000 making it into the U.S. They do not have a hard time finding jobs; in fact, many have been promised jobs promised before they even attempt to migrate.

As columnist Ruben Navarrette, Jr. has recently noted, “Illegal immigration can’t be blamed entirely on Mexico. Not as long as Americans remain addicted to the lifestyle that comes with ready access to cheap illegal immigrant labor.” Even those who think their hands are clean, he said, “live in cities with thriving economies – Dallas, Denver, Phoenix, Las Vegas and the like – and a major reason those economies are humming is because of a reliance on cheap illegal immigrant labor.” Navarrette quotes a California congressman who, during congressional hearings on immigration, pointed out that “it’s [as though] America has two signs on the U.S.-Mexican border: ‘Keep Out’ and ‘Help Wanted.’ If you can see past one, the other offers hope for a brighter day for you and your children. That’s hypocrisy.”

For decades, Mexico and the United States have had an unwritten understanding, a perfect situation for everyone except immigrants. Officially, the U.S. has
said, “Don’t come, don’t come – but if you make it we’ll put you to work. We’ll let you pay social security and taxes, but we won’t give you any worker benefits. You can do the jobs our workers don’t care about. Then, if we ever want you out, we can just send you home.” On the other hand, Mexico has said, “Well, let the people go. We can’t provide work for them, so this is a great escape valve. And they’ll send money to take care of their families that we don’t have to give. Hopefully things will get better someday and they can come back home.”

Does the large number of immigrant workers from Mexico and other countries have a negative impact on native-born U.S. workers? Do immigrants take jobs away from U.S. citizens? A study released in August 2006 by the Pew Hispanic Center, a non-partisan research institute in Washington, D.C., asserts that “rapid increases in the foreign-born population at the state level are not associated with negative effects on the employment of native-born workers.” The study examined both the boom years of the 1990s and the period of recession and recovery after 2000, and the study’s conclusion was that “no consistent pattern emerges to show that native-born workers suffered or benefited from increased numbers of foreign-born workers.” Reporting on a separate study, Daniel T. Griswold, an immigration expert at the Cato Institute, declared that “important sectors of our economy would be in deep trouble if they were deprived of their foreign-born workers, legal and illegal.” Moreover, James P. Smith, chairman of a panel for the National Research Council, believes the overall benefits from immigration outweigh the costs. “When immigrants come in, we as a nation gain from that,” he has said. “We win because our goods will be cheaper. Many more people will gain than lose.”

Let us not forget that U.S.-Mexico cooperation is good for both countries for more than mere economic, ethical, or spiritual reasons. The United States and Mexico are “family,” inextricably linked by history, proximity, and population, as well as a shared 1,947 mile border. Nonetheless, Mexicans also want to see their parents’ homeland south of the border grow, develop, and prosper. They would love for their children to be educated at home and have the opportunity to do important, fulfilling, profitable jobs in their own communities. Many would love to stay in Mexico in the warm circle of their own families and loved ones.

Mexicans are not asking for a handout. They can and will pay their own way. Mexico is rich in culture, art, music, faith, and natural resources, but its real wealth is in its people. They will give their all if they have the opportunity. Cooperation and sharing between the U.S. and Mexico is the only way to accomplish these goals so Mexico’s dreams – and those of the United States – come true.

The U.S. reaches out to Africa, and we should. We reach out to China, to India, and to many other territories, islands, and countries, and that is the way it should be. But Mexico is our neighbor, our partner, our brother, and we should first reach out to each other, and then together open our arms to the world.

I believe U.S. leaders can create immigration laws that, in President Bush’s words, will make us “a more compassionate, more humane, and stronger country. Indeed, people from both political parties – on the left and the right – are already making good faith proposals and first steps to bring order out of the chaos of the current immigration policy. There will be political battles and tough sledding as these and other measures are debated. Progress may be slower than we would like, but I have faith that suitable solutions can and will be found.

Juan Hernandez is a frequent commentator on immigration and U.S.-Mexican relations and, under Mexican President, Vicente Fox, he headed the Office for Mexicans Abroad. He has been a professor at various universities and was instrumental in the creation of a Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies at the University of Texas, Dallas.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Metropolis.
Summit on Integration Policy
On July 14, 2006, Germany hosted a summit on integration policy. Approximately 80 representatives from migrant organisations, trade unions, religious groups, as well as employers, premiers and Ministers of several states and some Lord Mayors were invited by Chancellor Angela Merkel to talk about education, labour, women’s rights, integration into urban society and a dialogue between cultures. Summit participants agreed to draft a National Integration Plan by the summer of 2007.

The integration summit took place more than 50 years after the first recruitment of Italian foreign workers to Germany, and it is only recently that the integration of migrants has become a focus of domestic policy. Today, 15 million migrants live in Germany; this includes 7 million long-term foreign residents, as well as 8 million citizens with migrant origins. Twenty percent of Germany’s residents are thus immigrants, and it is predicted that nearly 40 percent of the population in the country’s large urban centres will soon be immigrants.

Nonetheless, discussions in the lead-up to the summit were less than encouraging. In the wake of 9/11, integration and migration discourse largely centred on the topic of Islam, and there was a lengthy public debate on the wearing of the hijab by teachers in public schools. Discussion has now shifted to the topic of forced marriage and “honour killings” among Muslim immigrants (with a focus on Turkish immigrants, in particular). In addition to this, public attention has also focused on the failings of the education system, as well as acts of violence by young migrants. Worryingly, isolated cases are wrongly portrayed as widespread phenomena. Partly as a result, the Ministry of Interior has proposed to restrict family reunification and to make it more difficult to become a German citizen.

It is hoped, however, that the summit and the proposed National Integration Plan will put forward decisive measures and move Germany in the direction of becoming a true immigration society.

New Laws on Naturalization and Migration
Indeed, this change began in 1998 when Germany’s federal government recognized the immigration process as irreversible. At the same time, the government pointed to the importance of integration policy, and a modern Nationality Law was introduced as the centrepiece of this policy. This legislation came into effect in 2000 and introduced in Germany the principle of citizenship by place of birth (jus soli). Nonetheless, it took more than four years of political discussion to pass new migration legislation, which came into effect in 2005. This legislation was a political compromise, and its title reflects its purpose: “An Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of Foreigners.” The Act allows for the settlement only of highly qualified foreigners and the self-employed, and it has been less successful than anticipated in spite of a high demand for immigrants in these fields. In 2005, only about 1,000 highly qualified foreigners and self-employed immigrants arrived in Germany, while many more Germans left for attractive immigration countries, including Canada and the United States.

Although Germany’s new migration legislation does not allow or regulate large-scale immigration to Germany, it does, for the first time, regulate the “Promotion of Integration.” The integration of
foreigners is facilitated through so-called “integration courses,” which acquaint foreigners with the German language, legal system, history and culture. Up to 600 hours are spent on basic and advanced language courses, while 30 hours are devoted to an orientation course on Germany’s laws, history and culture. The integration courses are intended to assist foreigners in achieving independence in all aspects of daily life without the assistance or mediation of third parties.

Foreigners who are resident in Germany on a permanent basis attend the first part of their integration course upon receiving a residence permit for a) employment purposes, b) family reunification, or c) humanitarian reasons. They attend the second part of the course upon receiving a settlement permit. Foreigners are obliged to attend integration courses, and if they fail to meet this obligation, there may be consequences prior to the extension of their residence permit.

Recent developments in migration and integration policy in Germany provide some reason for optimism, but policy in these areas remains underdeveloped. Indeed, while migration legislation exists in name, there is limited labour migration, and while integration is promoted in legislation, it consists largely of language courses. It is hoped that the National Integration Plan stemming from Germany’s recent summit will fill some of the gaps that remain.

For more information on immigration policy and initiatives in Germany, visit:

http://www.zuwanderung.de/english/index.html

Metropolis in New Zealand

RICHARD BEDFORD
University of Waikato and Convenor, Migration Research Group

New Zealand’s representatives on the International Metropolis Steering Committee (Richard Bedford, Stephen Dunstan and Paul Spoonley) continue to collaborate on the organization of an annual seminar on immigration and settlement issues, which is aimed at researchers, policymakers and members of NGOs on immigration and settlement issues.

In April 2006, the two-day seminar took as its broad theme, “Pathways, Circuits and Crossroads: New Public Good Research on Population, Migration and Population Dynamics,” which drew on some of the concepts and ideas that underpin the 11th International Metropolis Conference in Lisbon in October 2006. These annual events follow the Metropolis Conference tradition of providing opportunities for researchers from universities, the public sector, and some private research organizations to share innovations in methodology and substantive findings from their inquiries. In 2006, greater attention was given to research that is being carried out by postgraduate students – the next generation of social scientists in the public and private sectors. Papers were grouped into eight sessions dealing respectively with:

- Innovations in immigration policy;
- New researcher perspectives on international migration;
- Perspectives on migration trends;
- Asia-Pacific themes;
- Dimensions of well-being in populations and communities;
- New researcher perspectives on regional/community development;
- Interventions: regional and community perspectives; and
- Innovations in research on regional and community economic change.

Amongst the rich variety of presentations were papers on the subsequent mobility of immigrants to New Zealand and Australia; German immigrants’ experiences of immigration and adaptation in New Zealand; the transnational networks of Korean international students in Auckland; the human capital of skilled migrants; income gains from migration for Pacific peoples; Chinese perspectives of indigenous Maori culture and society; attachment and well-being in small urban communities; integrating refugees into local health services; interventions for refugee resettlement; and house prices and rents and their socio-economic impacts.

Abstracts and presentations from the workshop are available on website of the University of Waikato’s Migration Research Group:

www.waikato.ac.nz/migration
The Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network was established in 1995 by Stephen Castles and Robyn Iredale with funding from the UNESCO-MOST (Management of Social Transformations) Programme. The Secretariat was located at the University of Wollongong until 2003 when it then moved to the Australian National University where it remains.

The central focus of APMRN is the long-term role of migration and the increased ethno-cultural diversity which results in the transformation of societies in Asia and the Pacific. The aim has always been to build an international research network in the region and to build research capability, including new theoretical and methodological approaches, develop empirical knowledge, and to contribute to policy debates and development. As with Metropolis, the intent is to ensure that academic research and discussion is accompanied by the involvement of those who have responsibility for policy and community consultation, especially with NGOs.

APMRN currently involves researchers and centres in seventeen member countries, including South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji (representing the Pacific generally) and the Republic of China (unofficially). It is hoped to include Nepal and Afghanistan soon.

The Director of the Secretariat is Dr. Robyn Iredale (robyn.iredale@anu.edu.au). The Chair is rotated every two years and is currently Professor Paul Spoonley (PSpoonley@massey.ac.nz) from New Zealand, while there are Deputy Chairs for each of North-East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific. Conferences are held every eighteen months, and have taken place in Bangkok, Tokyo, Manila, Suva, Singapore and Seoul. These conferences have been sponsored by the Participation Programme of UNESCO, as well as the University of Singapore and Japanese foundations. The next conference is scheduled for May 2007 and will be held in Fujian with a special focus on the greater Mekong sub-region.

Recent research has included issues concerning the ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers (see Working Paper Number 17, April 2006, which examines the issues in relation to this Convention for Bangladesh, Korea and New Zealand). There are also projects in relation to this Convention for the Philippines, Sri Lanka, China and Australia, as well as research on HIV vulnerability in South and North East Asia, which has been sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme. A special issue of Global Networks will soon be published based on papers presented at a workshop on Asian transnational families in Singapore. Moreover, there were recently a series of sessions – and 48 papers – on ‘Population and Vulnerability’ at the International Geographical Union’s Conference in Brisbane; these were co-hosted by the APMRN and IGU Commission.

Contact information, details about APMRN activities and copies of research publications can be found on the website: ➟ http://apmrn.anu.edu.au
Our Diverse Cities: World Urban Forum

In 2006, Metropolis partnered with the Housing and Homelessness Branch of Human Resources and Social Development Canada, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, the Multiculturalism Program of Canadian Heritage, and the Association for Canadian Studies to produce a new edition of Our Diverse Cities. This publication examines immigration and diversity in Canada’s second- and third-tier cities. Guest edited by James Frideres of the University of Calgary and featuring articles from researchers, policy-makers and non-governmental organizations and contributions from across Canada, Our Diverse Cities helps build awareness and understanding about the different ways diversity is manifesting itself in cities outside of the large urban centres. Metropolis released this publication at The World Urban Forum (WUF3), which was hosted by the Government of Canada and UN-HABITAT from June 19 to 23, 2006, in Vancouver, Canada. The theme of the conference was “Our Future: Sustainable Cities – Turning Ideas into Action,” and more than 10,000 participants from over 150 nations met to discuss how to make our cities better places to live.

To obtain a copy of Our Diverse Cities:  canada@metropolis.net
To view WUF3’s final report:  www.wuf3-fum3.ca

Negotiating Religious Pluralism: International Approaches

A recent special issue of Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne (Fall 2005) looks at international approaches to religious pluralism. This publication, which was supported by Metropolis, follows earlier internationally comparative editions, including one on “Multicultural Futures” and one on “National Identity and Diversity.” The special issue was guest edited by Matthias Köenig of the University of Bamberg, and it includes more than twenty articles on how Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway address issues arising from religious pluralism. Each country profile examines how countries have addressed religious pluralism with a focus on pragmatic solutions to the challenges posed by religious diversity.

To obtain a copy, contact:  canada@metropolis.net

Immigration and Families

The Spring 2006 issue of Canadian Themes / Thèmes canadiens looks at issues related to immigration and families, including family reunification policies, integration outcomes, and the impact of separation and reunification on migrants and their families. One aim of the publication was to shed light on common perceptions (and misconceptions) about family immigration, to describe the process of family migration, and to encourage greater research and policy discussion in this area. Guest edited by Madine VanderPlaat of Saint Mary’s University, the publication includes contributions from researchers, policy-makers and non-governmental organizations who work with immigrants and their families.

To obtain a copy, contact:  canada@metropolis.net
Over the last 45 years, the number of persons living outside their country of birth has more than doubled, from an estimated 75 million in 1960 to nearly 191 million in 2005. Almost half of the 191 million migrants in the world today are women,¹ and estimates put the number of migrant workers at over 86 million.² Given the scale of labour migration and its expected increase in the future, the management of labour migration is crucial. It is hardly surprising therefore that labour migration has moved to the top of policy agendas in many countries of origin, transit and destination.

The Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in Countries of Origin and Destination, authored by IOM’s Nilim Baruah and Ryszard Cholewinski, is a collaborative initiative containing expert contributions, including those from three international organizations: IOM, International Labour Organization (ILO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Handbook was prepared in response to the Slovenian Chair’s recommendation made at the 2005 OSCE Economic Forum. Its principal objective is to assist policy-makers and practitioners in the OSCE area and in countries served by IOM and ILO in their efforts to develop new policy solutions and approaches for the better management of labour migration in countries of origin and destination. The Handbook contains analyses of effective labour migration policies and practices, drawing on examples from OSCE participating States as well as other countries. Another important objective is to underline that the successful management of labour migration requires a deliberate approach to address the complex range of policy issues and choices involved. Countries that have achieved relative success in managing labour migration have done so because they have been prepared to admit past policy failures and to experiment with new approaches.

The Handbook has nine chapters: (1) the international legal framework for the protection of migrant workers; (2) an overview of the broader issues to which policy-makers in both countries of origin and destination must pay careful attention when crafting appropriate policies; (3) policies in countries of origin concerned with the protection of migrant workers, which is a priority concern for all labour-sending governments; (4) optimizing the benefits of labour migration, including marketing and the expansion of labour migration and enhancing the development impact of remittances; (5) the administration of labour migration in countries of origin through the establishment of adequate institutional capacity and effective inter-ministerial coordination; (6) foreign labour admission policies in countries of destination; (7) post-admission policies; (8) policy measures to prevent or reduce irregular migration; and (9) inter-state cooperation, both formal and informal, at the bilateral, regional and global levels, which is essential for labour migration to operate in an orderly and managed way and to benefit all stakeholders involved.

To obtain a copy of this or other publications, please contact the IOM Publications Unit:

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Events

11th International Metropolis Conference
Paths and Crossroads: Moving People, Changing Places

The 11th International Metropolis Conference will take place from October 2 to 6, 2006, in Lisbon, Portugal. The conference is an opportunity to discuss key issues related to migration and diversity, with a focus on new patterns of migration, the impacts of this movement, and the ways in which multiple actors — from both sending and receiving countries — are working to address human mobility, displacement, and the global market for migrants. His Excellency the President of the Portuguese Republic has honoured the conference with his High Patronage, and a number of academic institutions, government agencies, private sector companies and non-governmental organizations have provided generous support to the conference.

Plenary sessions will look at a range of topics including:

- Urban Vitality, Urban Renewal: How Immigrants Are Transforming Cities
- Sharing Responsibility in the Management of Migration and Development
- Contemporary Immigration Management: The Return to Temporary Programmes?
- Migration Challenges in the Western Mediterranean Region
- A Lusophone Community: Multinational Alliances, Multiple Belongings
- Integration and the “Second Generation”
- Moving People, Changing Places: What Should We Expect in 25 Years?

More than 70 workshops are planned, and topics include migration flows and mobility, social and economic integration, migration and development, diaspora and transnationalism, citizenship and belonging, and policy responses to immigration and diversity. A range of study tours will showcase Portugal’s history of immigration, as well as allowing for more in-depth discussion. Themes include civic participation, gender and migration, religious diversity, second-generation immigrants, education, the media, security and borders, and how institutions are responding to immigration and diversity.

The International Metropolis Conference has grown to become the largest annual gathering of experts on migration and diversity, and we expect more than 700 delegates from academe, government, and the non-governmental sectors to join us in Lisbon.

For information, click on the conference website:

www.international.metropolis.net/events/index_e.html

Immigration Futures

A Metropolis Inter-Conference Seminar on Immigration Futures took place from May 18 to 19, 2006, in Prato, Italy. Hosted by the Monash University’s Institute for the Study of Global Movements, the Australian Multicultural Foundation, and the Metropolis Project, the forum brought together some of the top academics, policy-makers and migration thinkers to discuss and debate, future migration flows, migration patterns, and the impact of out-migration on sending countries. The keynote address, delivered by Ron Skeldon, was entitled “Geography Matters.” Other sessions included:

- The Pattern of Migration Flows: Today and Tomorrow
- Selecting Skilled Immigrants: Comparative Approaches and Analysis
- Here to Stay? Permanent Migration versus Temporary Programs
- The Ethics of Cherry-Picking: Out-Migration and its Impact on Sending Countries
- Circular Migration

For more information on the seminar, visit

As part of its International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), the International Organization on Migration hosted an intersessional workshop on “Migrants and the Host Society: Partnerships for Success,” which took place in Geneva, Switzerland, from July 12 to 13, 2006. The IOM’s constitutional mandate is to provide a forum for governments, international and other organizations to exchange views and experiences and promote cooperation and coordination of efforts on international migration issues. However, in keeping with the overall IDM theme for 2006, “Partnerships in Migration: Engaging Business and Civil Society,” the workshop and earlier IDM activities have also paid considerable attention to the role of non-state actors, and particularly business, community and civil society organizations. The workshop was well-attended, with nearly 200 participants from 62 countries. Also represented were a range of international organizations (including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Population Fund, Inter-Governmental Consultations, the International Center for Migration Policy Development, the European Commission, the International Labour Organization and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie), as well as NGOs, academics and the private sector.

The IOM membership’s decision to hold a workshop on the integration of migrants reflects an increasing recognition that, in the context of growing human mobility, this issue has become one of the most important and complex contemporary challenges faced by governments and societies worldwide. As part of a comprehensive migration policy, consider strategies aimed at ensuring positive and mutually beneficial interaction between migrants and host societies are essential.

This workshop examined the evolving concept of integration, its multifaceted dimensions, strategies for making it successful, the role of principal stakeholders and the need for cooperation to ensure the development of effective integration policies and practices.

The following key themes emerged during the workshop:

- Changing patterns of migration affect all countries and require new approaches to integration. Due to the evolving nature of migration and its increasingly temporary nature, many traditional countries of destination found that their programs needed to be updated, while newer countries of destination were searching for answers to evolving migration issues. Several delegates remarked that their countries were in the process of reviewing legislation that affected migration and integration, and several more had recently updated similar legislation.

- The general consensus was that a dynamic two-way process between the migrant and the host society facilitated integration and allowed both parties to learn and benefit from one another. Integration programs that encouraged the two-way process with an emphasis on tolerance and mutual respect met with approval from the many panellists.

- Integration should be tailored to the needs of the migrant. Broad programs of integration and orientation do not address the specific needs of the migrant and do little to actualize integration. Integration programs can be adapted to an individual’s linguistic needs, cultural background, and socio-economic status. Tailored integration processes should also account for the specific region to which the migrant is travelling and orient him to the cultural specifics of that area.
■ Successful integration strategies need to be much more nuanced and flexible than previously thought. In years past, countries planned to accept migrants on a permanent basis, and the integration process was largely a progression towards citizenship. This approach is often not applicable in a temporary or circular migration pattern, and more countries are focusing on temporary migrants with less permanent statuses. Among the ideas discussed was a spectrum of options that bestowed some privileges on migrants, such as local voting rights, access to social services, and land ownership, without making them full citizens.

■ Integration takes place along several dimensions simultaneously and must occur within a framework of cooperation and respect. Participants repeatedly remarked that migrants and host societies must respect each other’s customs and that the migrants should always be afforded basic human rights.

■ The country of origin has responsibilities throughout the migrant’s journey. The country of origin provides critical pre-departure training, including language training, fundamental rights awareness, and basic cultural orientation to the country of destination. During the migrant’s time abroad, the country of origin can help protect the migrant through a consular outreach and monitoring system. These systems also strengthen the ties between the migrant and the country of origin, which encourage increased remittance flow and investment. Countries of origin can also facilitate the reintegration of the migrant upon return to the country of origin.

■ Finally, there is a need for partnerships between all stakeholders to encourage understanding, cooperation and respect throughout the migration process. These partnerships discourage xenophobia, expose myths, manage expectations, and best prepare both migrants and host societies for meaningful and successful integration.

Additional information on the workshop can be found at:

⇒ www.iom.int

1 Further information on IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration and all documents from its previous sessions can be accessed at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offence/pid/385.

2 In March 2006, another IDM workshop took place in Geneva and examined the theme of “Migration and Human Resources for Health: From Awareness to Action.” All materials from this workshop can be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/page850.html.
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